When does coordination require centralization? by Alonso, Ricardo et al.
  
Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek 
When does coordination require 
centralization? 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Alonso, Ricardo, Dessein, Wouter and Matouschek, Niko (2008) When does coordination require 
centralization? American Economic Review, 98 (1). pp. 145-179. ISSN 0002-8282  
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.145  
 
© 2008 American Economic Association 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58664/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2014 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Does Coordination Require Centralization?* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ricardo Alonso 
University of Southern California 
Wouter Dessein 
University of Chicago 
 
 
Niko Matouschek 
Northwestern University 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when managers are 
privately informed and communicate strategically. We consider a multi-divisional 
organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated 
with each other. Information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self-
interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk. The only available formal 
mechanism is the allocation of decision rights. We show that a higher need for 
coordination improves horizontal communication but worsens vertical communication. 
As a result, decentralization can dominate centralization even when coordination is 
extremely important relative to adaptation. 
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1 Introduction
Multi-divisional organizations exist primarily to coordinate the activities of their divisions. To do
so eﬃciently, they must resolve a trade-oﬀ between coordination and adaptation: the more closely
activities are synchronized across divisions, the less they can be adapted to the local conditions
of each division. To the extent that division managers are best informed about their divisions’
local conditions, eﬃcient coordination can be achieved only if these managers communicate with the
decision makers. A central question in organizational economics is whether eﬃcient communication
and coordination are more easily achieved in centralized or in decentralized organizations. In other
words, are organizations more eﬃcient when division managers communicate horizontally and then
make their respective decisions in a decentralized manner or when they communicate vertically
with an independent headquarters which then issues its orders?
This question has long been debated among practitioners and academics alike. Alfred Chandler,
for instance, argues that coordination requires centralization:
“Thus the existence of a managerial hierarchy is a defining characteristic of the modern business
enterprise. A multiunit enterprise without such managers remains little more than a federation of
autonomous oﬃces. [...] Such federations were often able to bring small reductions in information
and transactions costs but they could not lower costs through increased productivity. They could
not provide the administrative coordination that became the central function of modern business
enterprise.”1
Consistent with this view, many firms respond to an increased need for coordination by abandon-
ing their decentralized structures and moving towards centralization.2 There are, however, also
numerous managers who argue that eﬃcient coordination can be achieved in decentralized organi-
zations provided that division managers are able to communicate with each other. Alfred Sloan,
the long-time President and Chairman of General Motors, for instance, organized GM as a multi-
divisional firm and granted vast authority to the division managers.3,4 To ensure coordination
between them, Sloan set up various committees that gave the division managers an opportunity to
1Chandler (1977), pp.7-8.
2See for instance the DaimlerChrysler Commercial Vehicles Division (Hannan, Podolny and Roberts 1999), Procter
& Gamble (Bartlett 1989) and Jacobs Suchard (Eccles and Holland 1989).
3Our discussion of General Motors is based on “Co-ordination By Committee,” Chapter 7 in My Years With
General Motors by Alfred Sloan (1964).
4Writing to some of his fellow GM executives in 1923, for instance, Sloan stated that “According to General Motors
plan of organization, to which I believe we all heartily subscribe, the activities of any specific Operation are under
the absolute control of the General Manager of that Division, subject only to very broad contact with the general
oﬃcers of the Corporation.” (Sloan 1964, p.106).
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exchange ideas. In 1923, for example, he established the General Technical Committee to facilitate
coordination between the engineers in the various parts of the corporation. The committee did
not diminish the authority of the division managers and instead merely provided “a place to bring
these men together under amicable circumstances for the exchange of information and the ironing
out of diﬀerences.”5,6 In describing his plan to set up the committee to his fellow executives he
stated that
“I believe that such a plan properly developed gives the necessary balance between each Operation
and the Corporation itself and will result in all the advantages of co-ordinated action where such
action is of benefit in a broader way without in any sense limiting the initiative of independence of
action of any component part of the group.”7
The apparent success of Alfred Sloan’s GM and other decentralized firms in realizing inter-divisional
synergies suggest that in many cases coordination can indeed be achieved without centralization.8
The aim of this paper is to reconcile these conflicting views by analyzing when coordination
does and does not require centralization. Decentralized organizations have a natural advantage at
adapting decisions to local conditions since the decisions are made by the managers with the best
information about those conditions. However, such organizations also have a natural disadvantage
at coordinating since the manager in charge of one decision is uncertain about the decisions made
by others. Moreover, self-interested division managers may not internalize how their decisions
aﬀect other divisions. One might therefore reason naively that centralization is optimal when-
ever coordination is suﬃciently important relative to the need for adaptation. We argue that this
5Sloan (1964), p.105.
6Specifying the functions of the General Technical Committee Sloan stated that “The Committee would not, as
to principle, deal with the specific problems of any individual Operation. Each function of that Operation would
be under the absolute control of the General Manager of that Division.” (Sloan 1964, p.107). Reflecting on the
committee later, he stated that it “produced a free exchange of new and progressive ideas and experience among
division engineers. In short, it co-ordinated information. [...] the General Technical Committee was the mildest kind
of organization. Its most important role was that of a study group. It became known as a seminar. [...] Sometimes
the committee’s discussion would conclude with the approval of a new device or method, or a recommendation on
engineeering policy and procedure, but more often the results were simply that information was transmitted from
one to all” (Sloan 1964, p.109).
7Sloan (1964), p.106.
8Other, and more recent, examples of firms that rely on the managers of largely autonomous divisions to coordi-
nate their activities without central intervention are PepsiCo (Montgomery and Magnani 2001) and AES Corporation
(Pfeﬀer 2004). In the 1980s and early 90s PepsiCo centralized very few of the activities of its three restaurant chains
Pizza Hut, Taco Bell and KFC and ran them as what were essentially stand-alone businesses. The management
of PepsiCo believed that coordination between the restaurant chains could be achieved by encouraging the divi-
sion managers to share information and letting them decide themselves on their joint undertakings: “In discussing
coordination across restaurant chains, senior corporate executives stressed that joint activity should be initiated by
divisions, not headquarters. Division presidents should have the prerogative to decide whether or not a given division
would participate in any specific joint activity. As one explained, ‘Let them sort it out. Eventually, they will. It
will make sense. They will get to the right decisions.’” (Montgomery and Magnani 2001, p.12).
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reasoning is flawed and show that decentralization can be optimal even when coordination is very
important. Intuitively, when coordination becomes very important, division managers recognize
their interdependence and communicate and coordinate very well under decentralization. In con-
trast, under centralization, an increased need for coordination strains communication, as division
managers anticipate that headquarters will enforce a compromise. As a result, decentralization can
be optimal even when coordination becomes very important.
To investigate coordination in organizations we propose a simple model of a multi-divisional
organization with three main features: (i.) Decision making involves a trade-oﬀ between coordina-
tion and adaptation. In particular, two decisions have to be made and the decision makers must
balance the benefit of setting the decisions close to each other with that of setting each decision
close to its idiosyncratic environment or ‘state.’ Multinational enterprises (MNEs), for instance,
may realize scale economies by coordinating the product designs in diﬀerent regions. These cost
savings, however, must be traded oﬀ against the revenue losses that arise when products are less
tailored to local tastes. (ii.) Information about the states is dispersed and held by division man-
agers who are biased towards maximizing the profits of their own divisions rather than those of the
overall organization. Moreover, the division managers communicate their information strategically
to influence decision making in their favor. In the above MNE example, regional managers are
likely to be best informed about the local tastes of consumers and thus about the expected revenue
losses due to standardization. In communicating this information they have an incentive to behave
strategically to influence the decision making to their advantage. (iii.) The organization lacks com-
mitment. In particular, the only formal mechanism the organization can commit to is the ex ante
allocation of decision rights (Grossman and Hart 1986 and Hart and Moore 1990). This implies
that decision makers are not able to commit to make their decisions dependent on the information
they receive in diﬀerent ways. Communication therefore takes the form of cheap talk (Crawford
and Sobel 1982). In this setting we compare the performance of two organizational structures:
under Decentralization the division managers communicate with each other horizontally and then
make their decisions in a decentralized manner while under Centralization the division managers
communicate vertically with a headquarter manager who then makes both decisions.
Underlying our results are diﬀerences in how centralized and decentralized organizations aggre-
gate dispersed information. In our model vertical communication is always more informative than
horizontal communication. Essentially, since division managers are biased towards the profits of
their own divisions while headquarters aims to maximize overall profits, the preferences of a division
manager are more closely aligned with those of headquarters than with those of another division
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manager. As a result, division managers share more information with headquarters than they do
with each other. The diﬀerence in the quality of horizontal and vertical communication, how-
ever, diminishes, and eventually vanishes, as coordination becomes more important. In particular,
whereas an increased need for coordination leads to worse communication under Centralization, it
actually improves communication under Decentralization. Intuitively, when coordination becomes
more important, headquarters increasingly ignores the information that it receives from the division
managers about their local conditions. This induces each manager to exaggerate his case more
which, in turn, leads to less information being communicated. In contrast, under Decentralization
an increase in the need for coordination makes the managers more willing to listen to each other to
avoid costly coordination failures. As a result, the managers’ incentives to exaggerate are mitigated
and more information is communicated.
The fact that the diﬀerence in the quality of horizontal and vertical communication diminishes
as coordination becomes more important drives our central result: Decentralization can dominate
Centralization even when coordination is extremely important. Specifically, in symmetric organi-
zations — in which divisions are of equal size and have the same need for coordination and in which
decisions are made simultaneously — decentralization always outperforms centralization when the
division managers’ incentives are suﬃciently aligned. The same result also holds in asymmetric
organizations in which decisions are made sequentially or in which the divisions diﬀer in their need
for coordination. In organizations in which the divisions diﬀer in terms of their size the result also
holds as long as the size diﬀerence is not too large.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to, and borrows from, diﬀerent literatures.
Coordination in Organizations: A number of recent papers analyze coordination in organizations.
Hart and Holmström (2002) focus on the trade-oﬀ between coordination and the private benefits
of doing things ‘independently:’ under decentralization the division managers do not fully internal-
ize the benefits of coordination while under centralization the decision maker ignores the private
benefits that division managers realize if they act independently. In Hart and Moore (2005), some
agents specialize in developing ideas about the independent use of one particular asset, while others
think about the coordinated use of several assets. They analyze the optimal hierarchical structure
and provide conditions under which coordinators should be superior to specialists. Finally, in Des-
sein, Garicano and Gertner (2005), ‘product managers’ are privately informed about the benefits of
running a particular division independently, whereas a ‘functional manager’ is privately informed
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about the value of a coordinated approach. They endogenize the incentives for eﬀort provision and
the communication of this private information and show that functional authority is preferred when
eﬀort incentives are less important.
A key diﬀerence between these papers and ours is that in their models a trade-oﬀ between
centralization and decentralization arises because the incentives of the central decision maker are
biased towards coordination. In contrast, in our paper, authority is allocated to a benevolent
principal under centralization.9 Decentralization may nevertheless be strictly preferred because it
allows for a better use of dispersed information. Bolton and Farrell (1990) have also emphasized
this trade-oﬀ between coordination and the use of local information. In a model of entry they
show that decentralization is good at selecting a low cost entrant but also results in ineﬃcient
delay and duplication of entry. Unlike our paper, however, Bolton and Farrell (1990) rule out
communication.10
Our rationale for decentralization is also related to the literature on influence activities (Milgrom
1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1990), which argues that centralization induces agents to engage in
wasteful activities in an attempt to influence decision making. But whereas in Milgrom (1988) these
influence activities are pure waste, in our model they take the form of distorting local information
that is useful for decision making. In a related vein, Stein (2002), Ozbas (2005) and Friebel and
Raith (2006) argue that the distortion of local information by division managers limits the value
of centralization as a way to improve the eﬃcient reallocation of capital or resources. Unlike our
paper, however, communication is always vertical.11
Information Processing in Organizations: The large literature on team theory, starting with Mar-
shak and Radner (1972), constitutes the first attempt by economists to understand decision making
within firms. Team theory analyzes decision making in firms in which information is dispersed and
physical constraints make it costly to communicate or process this information. In doing so it
abstracts from incentive problems and assumes that agents act in the interest of the organization.
A team-theoretic model that is closely related to ours in spirit is Aoki (1986) who also compares
the eﬃciency of vertical and horizontal information structures.12 In contrast to this paper, and to
9Otherwise, the trade-oﬀ between coordination and adaptation is similar to the trade-oﬀs between coordination
and ‘independence’ considered in the above papers. Whereas in the above papers coordination is a binary choice, we
allow for decisions to be more or less coordinated.
10Also in Gertner (1999) headquarters is unbiased but it only intervenes when bargaining between divisions breaks
down. He shows how the presence of an independent arbitrator may foster information sharing.
11Our paper is further related to the large political economy literature on fiscal federalism which studies the choice
between centralization and decentralization in the organization of states (see Oates 1999 and Lockwood 2005 for
surveys).
12 In addition to Aoki (1986), we follow Dessein and Santos (2006) in modeling a trade-oﬀ between adaptation and
coordination. This paper shows how, in the presence of imperfect communication, extensive specialization results in
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team theory in general, our results do not depend on assumptions about physical communication
constraints. Instead, we endogenize communication quality as a function of incentive conflicts. As
such our analysis is related to the mechanism design approach to organizational design which also
focuses on the incentives of agents to misrepresent their information.13 This literature, however,
concentrates on settings in which the Revelation Principle holds and in which centralized organi-
zations are therefore always weakly optimal. In contrast, we develop a simple model in which the
Revelation Principle does not hold since agents are unable to commit to mechanisms. As a result
decentralized organizations can be strictly optimal.
Our no-commitment assumption is in line with a number of recent papers that adopt an in-
complete contracting approach to organizational design and model communication as cheap talk.14
Dessein (2002) considers a model in which a principal must decide between delegating decision
rights to an agent versus keeping control and communicating with that agent.15 Harris and Raviv
(2005) consider a similar set up but allow the principal to have private information while Alonso
and Matouschek (2007) endogenize the commitment power of the principal in an infinitely repeated
game. These papers, however, do not analyze coordination, nor do they allow for horizontal com-
munication.
A recent and independently developed paper that complements ours is Rantakari (2006). He
also analyzes coordination in organizations in which information is dispersed but focuses on settings
in which divisions diﬀer in their need for coordination. Among other results, he shows that in
such asymmetric settings it can be optimal to put in place asymmetric organizational structures in
which, for instance, all decision rights are concentrated in one division.
An alternative to our no-commitment assumption is to adhere to the mechanism design approach
but impose restrictions on communication, as in Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992). In
their model, a principal must decide whether to contract directly with two agents (centralization) or
to contract with one of them who then contracts himself with the second agent (decentralization).
Because of exogenous communication restrictions decentralized contracting allows for a better use
of local information, as in our model, and may therefore be preferred over centralized contracting.
Unlike our model, however, decentralization results in a hierarchical relationship between the two
organizations that ignore local knowledge. Also Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007) study how physical communication
constraints limit coordination. In their model, organizations face a trade-oﬀ between adopting a common technical
language, which allows for better coordination among units, or several specialized, distinct languages which are better
adapted to each unit. In Qian, Roland and Xu (2006), finally, diﬀerent organizational forms (M-form and U-form)
result in diﬀerent information structures, aﬀecting the organization’s ability to coordinate change.
13For a survey of this literature see Mookherjee (2006).
14Another related literature analyzes how adding a prior cheap talk stage matters in coordination games or games
with asymmetric information (Farrell 1987, Farrell and Gibbons 1989 or more recently Baliga and Morris 2002).
15See also Marino and Matsusaka (2005).
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agents. The control loss associated with decentralized contracting, therefore, does not come in the
form of a loss of coordination.
Cheap Talk and Expert Literature: From a methodological perspective our paper contributes to
the cheap talk and expert literatures that build on Crawford and Sobel (1982). In these models,
a receiver makes a decision after consulting with one or several privately informed but biased
senders or ‘experts.’ A technical diﬀerence between our model and that in Crawford and Sobel
(1982) is that we allow for the preferred decisions of the senders and receivers to coincide. As such
our paper is related to Melumad and Shibano (1990) who also allow for this possibility.16 A key
diﬀerence between their analysis and ours is that they focus on communication equilibria with a
finite number of intervals while we allow for equilibria with an infinite number of intervals. We
show that such equilibria maximize the expected joint surplus and that they are computationally
straightforward since they avoid the integer problems associated with finite interval equilibria. For
this reason we believe that our model is more tractable than the leading example in Crawford
and Sobel (1982), the traditional workhorse for cheap talk and expert applications.17 We further
diﬀer from both Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Melumad and Shibano (1990) in that we allow
for multiple senders. Also Battaglini (2002) and Krishna and Morgan (2001) consider models in
which a principal consults multiple informed experts, but these experts all observe the same piece
of information. The question they investigate is whether, and if so how, the principal can elicit this
information from the experts.18 In contrast, in our model the senders observe diﬀerent pieces of
independent information which makes it impossible to achieve truth-telling.
3 The Model
An organization consists of two operating divisions, Division 1 and Division 2, and potentially one
headquarters. Division j ∈ {1, 2} generates profits that depend on its local conditions, described
by θj ∈ R, and on two decisions, d1 ∈ R and d2 ∈ R. In particular, the profits of Division 1 are
given by
π1 = K1 − (d1 − θ1)2 − δ (d1 − d2)2 , (1)
where K1 ∈ R+ is the maximum profit that the division can realize. The first squared term
captures the adaptation loss that Division 1 incurs if decision d1 is not perfectly adapted to its
local conditions, that is, if d1 6= θ1, and the second squared term captures the coordination loss
16See also Stein (1989).
17See also Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007).
18See also Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) who study the impact of reputational concerns on communication in a
setting with multiple experts.
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that Division 1 incurs if the two decisions are not perfectly coordinated, that is, if d1 6= d2. The
parameter δ ∈ [0,∞) then measures the importance of coordination relative to adaptation. The
profits of Division 2 are similarly given by
π2 = K2 − (d2 − θ2)2 − δ (d1 − d2)2 , (2)
where K2 ∈ R+ is the maximum profit that Division 2 can realize. Without loss of generality we
set K1 = K2 = 0. Headquarters does not generate any profits.
Information: Each division is run by one manager. Manager 1, the manager in charge of Division
1, privately observes his local conditions θ1 but does not know the realization of θ2. Similarly,
Manager 2 observes θ2 but does not know θ1. The HQ Manager, that is, the manager in charge
of headquarters, observes neither θ1 nor θ2. It is common knowledge, however, that θ1 and θ2 are
uniformly distributed on [−s1, s1] and [−s2, s2] respectively, with s1 and s2 ∈ R+. The draws of θ1
and θ2 are independent.
Preferences: We assume that Manager 1 maximizes λπ1+(1−λ)π2 whereas Manager 2 maximizes
(1 − λ)π1 + λπ2, where λ ∈ [1/2, 1] . The parameter λ thus captures how biased each division
manager is towards his own division’s profits. The HQ Manager simply aggregates the preferences
of the two division managers and thus maximizes π1+π2.19 For simplicity we take the preferences
of the managers as given and do not model their origins. Intuitively, factors outside of our model,
such as explicit incentive contracts, career concerns and subjective performance evaluations are
prone to bias division managers towards maximizing the profits of the division under their direct
control as their managerial skills and eﬀort will be mainly reflected in the performance of this
division.20 ,21 In contrast, the skills and eﬀort of the HQ Manager are more likely to be reflected
in the overall performance of the organization, rather than in that of one particular division. In
principle, the organization might attempt to neutralize the division managers’ biases towards their
own divisions by compensating them more for the performance of the rest of the organization than
for that of their own division. As will become clear below, if it were possible to contract over λ, the
organization would always set λ = 1/2 and all organizational structures would perform equally well.
However, it will typically be undesirable for the organization to fully align managerial incentives
19For the results presented below it is not important that the HQ Manager is entirely unbiased. Qualitatively
similar results would be obtained as long as her utility function is a convex combination of that of Managers 1 and
2.
20 In the conclusion we sketch how one could endogenize the own-division bias by allowing the organization to design
the compensation schemes of the division managers.
21 In some cases implicit incentives may actually soften the own-division bias of division managers that are created
by explicit incentive schemes and other factors. See, for instance, our discussion of BP in Section 7.
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if the division managers have to make division specific eﬀort choices.22 Furthermore, to the extent
that divisions need to make many decisions, the allocation of one particular decision right is likely
to have only a negligible impact on endogenously derived incentives. It therefore seems reasonable,
as a first step, to assume that the division managers’ biases do not diﬀer across organizational
structures.23
Contracts and Communication: We follow the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart 1986,
Hart and Moore 1990) in assuming that contracts are highly incomplete. In particular, the orga-
nization can only commit to an ex ante allocation of decision rights. Agents are unable to contract
over the decisions themselves and over the communication protocol that is used to aggregate in-
formation. Once the decision rights have been allocated, they cannot be transferred before the
decisions are made. We focus on two allocations of decision rights. Under Decentralization Man-
ager 1 has the right to make decision d1 and Manager 2 has the right to make decision d2 and both
decisions are made simultaneously. Under Centralization both decision rights are held by the HQ
Manager.24
The lack of commitment implies that the decision makers are not able to commit to paying
transfers that depend on the information they receive or to make their decisions depend on such
information in diﬀerent ways. Communication therefore takes the form of an informal mecha-
nism: cheap talk. For simplicity we assume that this informal communication occurs in one round
of communication. In particular, under Decentralization Manager 1 sends message m1 ∈ M1 to
Manager 2 and, simultaneously, Manager 2 sends message m2 ∈M2 to Manager 1. Under Central-
ization, Managers 1 and 2 simultaneously send messages m1 ∈ M1 and m2 ∈ M2 to headquarters.
We refer to communication between the division managers as horizontal communication and that
between the division managers and headquarters as vertical communication. It is well known in
the literature on cheap talk games that repeated rounds of communication may expand the set
22The conflict between motivating eﬃcient eﬀort provision, on the one hand, and eﬃcient decision making and/or
communication, on the other, has been analyzed in a number of recent papers (Athey and Roberts 2001; Dessein,
Garicano and Gertner 2005; Friebel and Raith 2006). These papers show that it is typically optimal for organizations
to bias division managers towards their own divisions to motivate eﬀort provision even if doing so distorts their
incentives on other dimensions. See also Footnote 21.
23 In reality λ can be very big and in some cases it can even be equal to one. GM provides a historical example of
such a case: “Under the incentive system in operation before 1918, a small number of division managers had contracts
providing them with a stated share in the profits of their own divisions, irrespective of how much the corporation as a
whole earned. Inevitably, this system exaggerated the self-interest of each division at the expense of the interests of
the corporation itself. It was even possible for a division manager to act contrary to the interests of the corporation
in his eﬀort to maximize his own division’s profits.” (Sloan 1964, p.409).
24A natural variation of Decentralization is to allow for sequential decision making and a natural variation of
Centralization is to centralize both decision rights in one of the divisions. It turns out that the former structure
dominates the latter. We discuss the former structure in Section 8.
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of equilibrium outcomes even if only one player is informed.25 However, even for a simple cheap
talk game such as the leading example in Crawford and Sobel (1982), it is still an open question
as to what is the optimal communication protocol. Since it is our view that communication is an
‘informal’ mechanism which cannot be structured by the mechanism designer, it seems reasonable
to focus on the simplest form of informal communication. In this sense, we take a similar approach
as the property rights literature which assumes that players engage in ex post bargaining but limits
the power of the mechanism designer to structure this bargaining game.
A key feature of our model is its symmetry: the divisions are of equal size, they have the same
need for coordination and the two decisions are made simultaneously. We focus on a symmetric
organization since it greatly simplifies the analysis. In Section 8, however, we allow for asymmetries
between the divisions and discuss how such asymmetries aﬀect our results.
The game is summarized in Figure 1. First, decision rights are allocated to maximize the total
expected profits E [π1 + π2]. Under Centralization the HQ Manager gets the right to make both
decisions and under Decentralization each division manager gets the right to make one decision.
Second, the division managers become informed about their local conditions, that is, they learn
θ1 and θ2 respectively. Third, the division managers communicate with the decision makers.
Under Centralization they engage in vertical communication, sending messages m1 and m2 to
headquarters, while under Decentralization they engage in horizontal communication, exchanging
messages m1 and m2 with each other. Finally, the decisions d1 and d2 are made. Each decision
maker chooses the decision that maximizes his or her payoﬀ given the information that has been
communicated.
25See, for example, Aumann and Hart (2003) and Krishna and Morgan (2004).
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4 Decision Making
In this section we characterize decision making under Centralization and Decentralization, taking as
given the posterior beliefs of the decision makers over θ1 and θ2. In Section 5 we then characterize
the communication subgame and hence endogenize these beliefs. Finally, in Section 6 we draw
on our understanding of the decision making and the communication subgame to compare the
performance of the two organizational structures. The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are
in Appendix A.
Under Centralization, the HQManager receives messagesm1 andm2 from the division managers
and then chooses the decisions d1 and d2 that maximize E [π1 + π2 | m], that is, her expectation
of overall profits given messages m ≡ (m1,m2). The decisions that solve this problem are convex
combinations of the HQ Manager’s posterior beliefs of θ1 and θ2 given m:
dC1 ≡ γCE [θ1 | m] + (1− γC) E [θ2 | m] (3)
and
dC2 ≡ (1− γC) E [θ1 | m] + γCE [θ2 | m] , (4)
where
γC ≡
1 + 2δ
1 + 4δ
. (5)
Note that γC is decreasing in δ and ranges from 1/2 to 1. When the decisions are independent,
that is when δ = 0, the HQ Manager sets dC1 = E [θ1 | m] and dC2 = E [θ2 | m]. As the importance
of coordination δ increases, she puts less weight on E [θ1 | m] and more weight on E [θ2 | m] when
making decision d1. Eventually, as δ →∞, she puts the same weight on both decisions, that is, she
sets dC1 = d
C
2 = E [θ1 + θ2 | m] /2.
Under Decentralization, the division managers first send each other messagesm1 andm2. Once
the messages have been exchanged, Manager 1 chooses d1 to maximize E [λπ1 + (1− λ)π2 | θ1,m]
and, simultaneously, Manager 2 chooses d2 to maximize E [(1− λ)π1 + λπ2 | θ2,m]. The decision
that Manager 1 makes is a convex combination of his local conditions, θ1, and of the decision
E [d2 | θ1,m] that he expects Manager 2 to make:
d1 =
λ
λ+ δ
θ1 +
δ
λ+ δ
E [d2 | θ1,m] . (6)
Similarly, we have that
d2 =
λ
λ+ δ
θ2 +
δ
λ+ δ
E [d1 | θ2,m] , (7)
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where E [d1 | θ2,m] is the decision that Manager 2 expects Manager 1 to make. It is intuitive that
the weight that each division manager puts on his state is increasing in the own-division bias λ and
decreasing in the importance of coordination δ.
The decisions E [d2 | θ1,m] and E [d1 | θ2,m] that each division manager expects his counterpart
to make can be obtained by taking the expectations of (6) and (7). Doing so and substituting back
into (6) and (7) we find that Manager 1’s decision is a convex combination of his local conditions
θ1, his posterior belief about θ2 and Manager 2’s posterior belief about θ1:
dD1 ≡
λ
λ+ δ
θ1 +
δ
λ+ δ
µ
δ
λ+ 2δ
E [θ1 | θ2,m] + λ+ δλ+ 2δE [θ2 | θ1,m]
¶
. (8)
Similarly, we have that
dD2 ≡
λ
λ+ δ
θ2 +
δ
λ+ δ
µ
λ+ δ
λ+ 2δ
E [θ1 | θ2,m] + δλ+ 2δE [θ2 | θ1,m]
¶
. (9)
It can be seen that as δ increases, Manager j = 1, 2 puts less weight on his private information θj
and more weight on a weighted average of the posterior beliefs. As δ →∞, the division managers
only rely on the communicated information and set dD1 = d
D
2 = (E [θ1 | θ2,m] + E [θ2 | θ1,m])/2.
Note that, for given posteriors, these are exactly the same decisions that headquarters implements
when δ →∞.
5 Strategic Communication
In this section we analyze communication under the two organizational structures. A key insight of
this section is that while vertical communication is more informative than horizontal communication
this diﬀerence decreases, and eventually vanishes, as coordination becomes more important. This
is so since an increase in the need for coordination improves horizontal communication but worsens
vertical communication.
We proceed by investigating the division managers’ incentives to misrepresent information in
the next sub-section. This then allows us to characterize the communication equilibria in Section
5.2 and to compare the quality of vertical and horizontal communication in Section 5.3. Finally, in
Section 5.4 we derive the expected profits and show that they can be expressed as linear functions
of the quality of communication.
5.1 Incentives to Misrepresent Information
To understand how communication works in our model, it is useful to start by analyzing the
division managers’ incentives to misrepresent their information. For this purpose, suppose that
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the division managers can credibly misrepresent their information, that is, they can choose the
posterior beliefs of the person they are communicating with. Regardless of the organizational
structure, the division managers then tend to exaggerate their states. To see this, consider
first the incentives of Manager 1 to misrepresent his information under Centralization.26 When
making decision d1, the HQ Manager puts more weight on coordinating it with d2, and less on
adapting it to θ1, than Manager 1 would like her to. Since E [θ2] = 0 this implies that if Manager
1 truthfully communicated the state, the decision E[d1 | θ1] that he would expect headquarters
to make would not be suﬃciently extreme from his perspective. In other words, if θ1 > 0, he
would expect headquarters to make a decision d1 > 0 that is too small from his perspective and
if θ1 < 0 he would expect headquarters to make a decision d1 < 0 that is not small enough. To
induce headquarters to choose a more extreme decision, Manager 1 therefore exaggerates his state
by reporting m1 > θ1 if θ1 > 0 and m1 < θ1 if θ1 < 0.
Consider next the incentives of Manager 1 to misrepresent his information when he communi-
cates with Manager 2 under Decentralization. When Manager 2 makes decision d2, he puts less
weight on coordinating it with d1, and more on adapting it to θ2, than Manager 1 would like him
to. Since E [θ2] = 0, this implies that if Manager 1 truthfully communicated his state, the decision
E[d2 | θ1] that he would expect Manager 2 to make would not be suﬃciently extreme from his
perspective. In particular, if θ1 > 0, he would expect Manager 2 to make a decision that is too
small. To induce Manager 2 to make a larger decision, Manager 1 would like him to believe that
he will choose a more extreme decision d1. For this reason, Manager 1 again exaggerates his state,
that is, he reports m1 > θ1 > 0. Similarly, if θ1 < 0, Manager 1 exaggerates his state by reporting
m1 < θ1 to induce Manager 2 to make a smaller decision than he otherwise would.
The division managers’ incentives to misrepresent their information are therefore qualitatively
similar under the two organizational structures. Moreover, it is intuitive that under both struc-
tures, the division managers have a stronger incentive to exaggerate their information, the more
biased they are towards their own divisions. There is, however, an important diﬀerence in how
the incentives to exaggerate are aﬀected by changes in the need for coordination. In particular,
while under Centralization an increase in the need for coordination exacerbates the division man-
agers’ incentives to exaggerate their information, it mitigates them under Decentralization. To
understand this, recall that under Centralization the HQ Manager puts more weight on coordinat-
ing d1 with d2, and less weight on adapting it to the communicated value of θ1, than Manager 1
would like her to. An increase in the need for coordination then makes the HQ Manager even less
26The argument for Manager 2 is analogous.
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responsive to the communicated information and thus increases the division manager’s incentives
to exaggerate his information. In contrast, under Decentralization, Manager 2 puts less weight on
coordinating d2 with what he expects decision d1 to be, and more weight on adapting it to θ2, than
Manager 1 would like him to. An increase in the need for coordination then makes Manager 2 more
responsive to the communicated information and thereby reduces the division manager’s incentive
to exaggerate his information.
To understand the incentives to misrepresent information more formally, consider first Central-
ization. Let ν1 = E [θ1 | m1] be the HQ Manager’s expectation of θ1 after receiving message m1
and suppose that Manager 1 can simply choose any ν1. In other words, suppose that Manager 1
can credibly misrepresent his information about his state. Ideally, Manager 1 would like the HQ
Manager to have the posterior that maximizes his expected payoﬀ:
ν∗1 = argmaxν1
E
h
−λ (d1 − θ1)2 − (1− λ) (d2 − θ2)2 − δ (d1 − d2)2 | θ1
i
, (10)
where d1 = dC1 and d2 = d
C
2 as defined in (3) and (4). We will see below that in equilib-
rium the expected value of the posterior of θ2 is equal to the expected value of θ2, that is, that
Em2 [E [θ2 | m2]] = E [θ2] = 0. Assuming that this relationship holds we can use (10) to obtain
ν∗1 − θ1 =
(2λ− 1) δ
λ+ δ
θ1 ≡ bCθ1. (11)
Since bC ≥ 0 this confirms the above intuition that Manager 1 exaggerates his state whenever
θ1 6= 0. Only when θ1 = 0 does he have an incentive to communicate truthfully. Moreover, it can
be seen that his incentives to exaggerate are increasing in |θ1|. It is also straightforward to verify
that bC is increasing in λ and δ. Thus, as explained above, Manager 1’s incentive to exaggerate is
increasing in the own-division bias and in the need for coordination.
Consider next the division managers’ incentives to misrepresent their information under De-
centralization. For this purpose, let ν1 = E [θ1 | θ2,m1] be Manager 2’s expectation of θ1 after
receiving message m1 and suppose again that Manager 1 can simply choose any ν1. His optimal
choice of ν1 is given by (10), where d1 = dD1 and d2 = d
D
2 as defined in (8) and (9). If we assume
again that Em2 [E [θ2 | θ1,m2]] = E [θ2] = 0, which will be shown to hold in equilibrium, then it
follows that, for δ > 0,
ν∗1 − θ1 =
(2λ− 1) (λ+ δ)
λ (1− λ) + δ θ1 ≡ bDθ1. (12)
Thus, it is again the case that Manager 1 has no incentive to misrepresent his information when
θ1 = 0, that he has an incentive to exaggerate it if θ1 6= 0 and that his incentive to exaggerate
is increasing in |θ1|. Moreover, it can be verified that bD is increasing in λ and decreasing in δ.
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Thus, as anticipated above, Manager 1’s incentive to exaggerate is increasing in his own-division
bias and decreasing in the need for coordination.
5.2 Communication Equilibria
We now show that, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), all communication equilibria are interval
equilibria in which the state spaces [−s1, s1] and [−s2, s2] are partitioned into intervals and the
division manager only reveal which interval their local conditions θ1 and θ2 belong to. In this sense
the managers’ communication is noisy and information is lost. Moreover, the size of the intervals —
which determines how noisy communication is — depends directly on bD and bC as defined in (11)
and (12).
A communication equilibrium under each organizational structure is characterized by (i.) com-
munication rules for the division managers, (ii.) decision rules for the decision makers and (iii.)
belief functions for the message receivers. The communication rule for Manager j = 1, 2 specifies
the probability of sending message mj ∈Mj conditional on observing state θj and we denote it by
μj (mj | θj). Under Centralization, the decision rules map messages m1 ∈ M1 and m2 ∈ M2 into
decisions d1 ∈ R and d2 ∈ R and we denote them by dC1 (m) and dC2 (m). Under Decentralization,
the decision rule for Manager 1 maps the state θ1and messages m1 ∈ M1 and m2 ∈ M2 into deci-
sion d1 ∈ R while the decision rule for Manager 2 maps the state θ2 and messages m1 ∈ M1 and
m2 ∈M2 into decision d2 ∈ R, and we denote them by dD1 (m, θ1) and dD2 (m, θ2). Finally, the belief
functions are denoted by gj (θj | mj) for j = 1, 2 and state the probability of state θj conditional
on observing message mj .
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the communication subgame which require that
(i.) communication rules are optimal for the division managers given the decision rules, (ii.) the
decision rules are optimal for the decision makers given the belief functions and (iii.) the belief
functions are derived from the communication rules using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. Formally,
whenever μ1(m1 | θ1) > 0 then m1 ∈ argmaxm∈M1 E
£
λπl1 + (1− λ)πl2 | θ1
¤
for l = C,D, where
πl1 and π
l
2 are the profits of Divisions 1 and 2 given that decisions are made according to d
l
1 (·)
and dl2 (·). The requirement for μ2(m2 | θ2) is analogous. Under Centralization the decision
rules dC1 (·) and dC2 (·) solve max(d1,d2) E [π1 + π2 | m] and under Decentralization the decision rules
dD1 (·) and dD2 (·) solve maxd1 E [λπ1 + (1− λ)π2 | m, θ1] and maxd2 E [(1− λ)π1 + λπ2 | m, θ2] re-
spectively. Finally, the belief functions satisfy g (θj | m) = μj(mj | θj)/
R
P μj(mj | θj)dθj , where
P =
©
θj : μj(mj | θj) > 0
ª
and j = 1, 2.
Since all communication equilibria will be shown to be interval equilibria, we denote by a2Nj ≡
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(aj,−N , ..., aj,−1, aj,0, aj,1, ..., aj,N) and a2N−1j ≡ (aj,−N , ..., aj,−1, aj,1, ..., aj,N) the partitioning of
[−sj , sj ] into 2N and 2N − 1 intervals respectively, where aj,−N = −sj , aj,0 = 0 and aj,N = sj .
Thus, a2Nj corresponds to finite interval equilibria with an even number of intervals and a
2N−1
j
corresponds to those with an odd number of intervals. As will be shown in the next proposition,
the end points are symmetrically distributed around zero, that is, aj,i = aj,−i for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
The following proposition characterizes the finite communication equilibria when δ > 0.
PROPOSITION 1 (Communication Equilibria). If δ ∈ (0,∞), then for every positive integer Nj ,
j = 1, 2, there exists at least one equilibrium (μ1(·), μ2(·) , d1(·), d2(·), g1(·), g2(·)), where
i. μj(mj | θj) is uniform, supported on [aj,i−1, aj,i] if θj ∈ (aj,i−1, aj,i),
ii. gj(θj | mj) is uniform supported on [aj,i−1, aj,i] if mj ∈ (aj,i−1, aj,i),
iii. aj,i+1 − aj,i = aj,i − aj,i−1 + 4baj,i for i = 1, ..., Nj − 1
aj,−(i+1) − aj,−i = aj,−i − aj,−(i−1) + 4baj,−i for i = 1, ..., Nj − 1
with b = bC under Centralization, where bC is defined in (11), and
b = bD under Decentralization, where bD is defined in (12),
iv. dj(m, θj) = dCj , j = 1, 2, under Centralization, where d
C
j are given by (3) and (4) and
dj(m, θj) = dDj , j = 1, 2, under Decentralization, where d
D
j are given by (8) and (9).
Moreover, all other finite equilibria have relationships between θ1 and θ2 and the managers’ choices
of d1 and d2 that are the same as those in this class for some value of N1 and N2; they are
therefore economically equivalent.
The communication equilibria are illustrated in Figure 2. In these equilibria each division
manager communicates what interval his state lies in. The size of the intervals is determined by
the diﬀerence equations in Part (iii.) of the proposition. The size of an interval (aj,i+1 − aj,i) equals
the size of the preceding interval (aj,i − aj,i−1), plus 4bCaj,i under Centralization and 4bDaj,i under
Decentralization, where aj,i is the dividing point between the two intervals. Recall from Section
5.1, that bCθj , j = 1, 2, is the diﬀerence between the true state of nature θj and what Manager
j would like the HQ Manager to believe that the state is. Similarly, bDθj , j = 1, 2, represents by
how much Manager j wants to misrepresent his state when talking to the other division manager
under Decentralization. The incentives to distort information thus directly determine how quickly
communication deteriorates as θj is further away from its mean.27 It is intuitive that since
27This can be related to the leading example in Crawford and Sobel (1982). In that model, there is a fixed diﬀerence
b between the the true state of nature and what the sender would like the receiver to believe is the true state, and
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Figure 2: Communication Equilibria
the incentives to misrepresent information are increasing in |θj |, not only is it the case that less
information is transmitted the larger |θj | , but also the rate at which communication becomes noisier
is increasing in |θj | .
Proposition 1 characterizes communication equilibria for δ > 0. In the absence of any need for
coordination the communication equilibria are straightforward. In particular, under Centraliza-
tion, truth-telling can be sustained if δ = 0 since, in this case, there is no incentive conflict between
the division managers. While there are other equilibria, we assume in the remaining analysis
that when δ = 0 the managers coordinate on the truth-telling equilibrium. Under Decentraliza-
tion, communication is irrelevant when δ = 0 since it is optimal for each division manager to set his
decision equal to his state which, of course, he observes directly. This implies that for δ = 0 all com-
munication strategies are consistent with a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium under Decentralization.
Merely to facilitate the exposition of one comparative static that we perform later, and without
losing generality, we assume that for δ = 0 the communication equilibrium under Decentralization
is as those described in Proposition 1.28
Proposition 1 shows that there does not exist an upper limit on the number of intervals that can
equivalently, intervals grow at a fixed rate of 4b rather than 4baj,i.
28See our discussion of equation (18).
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be sustained in equilibrium. This is in contrast to Crawford and Sobel (1982) where the maximum
number of intervals is always finite. This diﬀerence is due to the fact that in our model there
exists a state, namely θj = 0 for j = 1, 2, in which the incentives of the sender and the receiver
are perfectly aligned.29 In Crawford and Sobel (1982) this possibility is ruled out. The next
proposition shows that in the limit in which the number of intervals goes to infinity, the strategies
and beliefs described in Proposition 1 constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and that the total
expected profits are maximized in this equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2 (Eﬃciency). The limit of strategy profiles and beliefs (μ1(·), μ2(·), d1(·), d2(·),
g1(·), g2(·)) as N1, N2 → ∞ is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the communication game. In
this equilibrium the total expected profits E [π1 + π2] are higher than in any other equilibrium.
An illustration of an equilibrium in which the number of intervals goes to infinity is provided in
Figure 2. In such an equilibrium the size of the intervals is infinitesimally small when θj , j = 1, 2,
is close to zero but grows as |θj | increases. We believe that it is reasonable to assume that the
organization is able to coordinate on the equilibrium that maximizes the expected overall profits
and we focus on this equilibrium for the rest of the analysis.
5.3 Communication Comparison
We can now compare the quality of communication under the two organizational structures and
analyze how it is aﬀected by changes in the need for coordination and the own-division bias. We
measure the quality of communication as the residual variance E
h
(θj − E [θj |mj ])2
i
of θj , j = 1, 2.
The next lemma derives the residual variance under vertical and horizontal communication.
LEMMA 1. In the most eﬃcient equilibrium in which N1, N2 →∞ the residual variance is given
by
E
h
(θj − E [θj |mj ])2
i
= Slσ2j j = 1, 2 and l = C,D,
where
Sl =
bl
3 + 4bl
. (13)
The residual variance is therefore directly related to the division managers’ incentives to mis-
represent information as defined in (11) and (12). In particular, when bl = 0, l = C,D, then the
division managers perfectly reveal their information and as a result the residual variance is zero.
As bl increases, less information is communicated in equilibrium and the residual variance increases.
29We share this feature with Melumad and Shibano (1991); see the related literature in Section 2.
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Finally, as bl → ∞, the division managers only reveal whether their state is positive or negative
and thus Sl → 1/4. We can now state the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3 (The Quality of Communication).
i. SC = SD = 0 if λ = 1/2 and SD > SC otherwise,
ii. ∂SD/∂λ > ∂SC/∂λ > 0,
iii. ∂SC/∂δ > 0 > ∂SD/∂δ and limδ→∞ SD = limδ→∞ SC.
Parts (i.) and (ii.) are illustrated in Figure 3 and show that vertical communication is in general
more eﬃcient than horizontal communication. To understand this, recall that for λ = 1/2 commu-
nication is perfect under both organizational structures and note, from Part (ii.), that an increase
in the own-division bias λ has a more detrimental eﬀect on horizontal than on vertical communica-
tion. This is the case since, under Centralization, an increase in λ increases the bias of the senders
but does not aﬀect the decision making of the receiver. In contrast, under Decentralization, an
increase in λ also leads to more biased decision making by the receiver.
Part (iii.) is illustrated in Figure 4 and shows that the diﬀerence in the quality of the two modes
of communication diminishes as the need for coordination increases. As discussed in Section 5.1
this key property is due to the fact that a higher δ increases the incentives of division managers to
misrepresent their information under Centralization but reduces them under Decentralization. Part
(iii.) also shows that as δ increases the diﬀerence in the quality of the two modes of communication
not only shrinks but actually vanishes. This can be understood by recalling from Section 4 that
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in the limit in which δ →∞ the decision making under Centralization and under Decentralization
converge: under both structures the decisions are set equal to the average posterior. It is then not
surprising that the quality of communication also converges.
5.4 Organizational Performance
We can now state the expected profits for each organizational structure.
PROPOSITION 4 (Organizational Performance). Under Centralization the expected profits are
given by
ΠC = − (AC + (1−AC)SC)
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
, (14)
and under Decentralization they are given by
ΠD = − (AD +BDSD)
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
, (15)
where
AC ≡
2δ
1 + 4δ
, AD ≡
2
¡
λ2 + δ
¢
δ
(λ+ 2δ)2
and BD ≡ δ2
4λ3 + 6λ2δ + 2δ2 − λ2
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
. (16)
The proposition shows that under both organizational structures the expected profits are a linear
function of the underlying uncertainty
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
and the sum of the residual variances Sl
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
,
l = C,D.
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Since the HQ Manager’s decision making is eﬃcient, the first best expected profits would be
realized if she were perfectly informed, that is, if SC = 0. It then follows from (14) that the first
best expected profits are given by −AC
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
. It is intuitive that these expected profits are
decreasing in the need for coordination and are independent of the division managers’ bias.
The expected profits under Centralization diﬀer from the first best benchmark since the HQ
Manager is in general not perfectly informed. In particular, the more biased the division managers
are towards their own divisions, the less information is communicated and thus the lower the
expected profits. The expected profits are also decreasing in δ: not only does an increase in the
need for coordination lead to worse communication but it also reduces the expected profits for any
given communication quality.
The expected profits under Decentralization diﬀer from the first best both because of imperfect
communication and because the division managers’ decision making is biased. Since an increase in
the own-division bias leads to worse communication and to more biased decision making it clearly
reduces the expected profits. The impact of an increase in δ, in contrast, is ambiguous: it improves
communication but it reduces the expected profits for any given communication quality.
6 Centralization versus Decentralization
We can now compare the performance of the two organizational structures. A clear advantage of
a decentralized organization is that it puts in control those managers who are closest to the local
information. In contrast, in a centralized organization some of this information is lost when it is
communicated to the decision maker. Naturally, the lack of local information impairs the ability
of a centralized organization to adapt decisions to the local conditions.
However, while Decentralization has an advantage at adapting decisions to local conditions, it
has a disadvantage at ensuring that the decisions are coordinated. This is so for two reasons. First,
the division managers do not fully internalize the need for coordination and, as such, put excessive
weight on adapting their decisions to the local conditions. Second, eﬀective coordination requires
that the manager who makes one decision knows what the other decision is. Under Centralization
this is naturally the case since both decisions are made by the same manager. In contrast, under
Decentralization Manager j = 1, 2 is uncertain about what decision Manager k 6= j will make
since communication between them is imperfect. In sum, division managers lack both the right
incentives and the right information to ensure eﬀective coordination while headquarters lacks the
information to eﬃciently adapt decisions to the local conditions.
The next lemma shows that because of these factors coordination losses are always lower un-
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der Centralization and adaptation losses are always lower under Decentralization. To state this
lemma, let ALl = E
h¡
dl1 − θ1
¢2
+
¡
dl2 − θ2
¢2i
, l = C,D, denote the adaptation losses under the
two organizational structures and let CLl = E
h¡
dl1 − dl2
¢2i
denote the coordination losses.
LEMMA 2. For all λ ∈ [1/2, 1] and δ ∈ [0,∞), ALC ≥ ALD and CLC ≤ CLD.
In what follows, we refer to ∆AL ≡ ALC − ALD ≥ 0 as the adaptation advantage of the
decentralized structure and to ∆CL ≡ CLC − CLD ≥ 0 as the coordination advantage of the
centralized one. The relative performance of the two structures can then be stated as
ΠC −ΠD = −∆AL+ 2δ∆CL. (17)
From the result that Centralization has a coordination advantage, one could reason naively that
Centralization will prevail if the need for coordination δ is suﬃciently important. A key insight of
this section is that this reasoning is flawed. To see this, consider first Figure 5 which plots the rela-
tive performance ΠC −ΠD for
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
= 1.30 The figure shows that when λ > 1/2 is suﬃciently
small, Decentralization strictly outperforms Centralization for any finite δ. In other words, the
Delegation Principle — which states that decision rights should be delegated to the best informed
managers provided that their incentives are suﬃciently aligned — always holds, independent of the
need for coordination.31 Thus, as claimed above, Decentralization can dominate Centralization
even when coordination is very important. Essentially, when the own-division bias is very small
and coordination is very important, the division managers have both the incentives and the infor-
mation to coordinate their decisions with each other. In contrast, the ability of headquarters to
adapt the decisions to their states is limited by the fact that vertical communication becomes less
eﬃcient as coordination becomes more important. As a result, the adaptation advantage of the
decentralized structure can dominate the coordination advantage of the centralized one even when
coordination is very important.
Figure 5 also shows that Decentralization strictly dominates Centralization for any own-division
bias λ > 1/2 when the need for coordination δ > 0 is suﬃciently small. Centralization therefore
only dominates Decentralization when both the need for coordination and the own-division bias
are large enough. Finally, the figure shows that the two organizational structures perform equally
well when either λ = 1/2, δ = 0 or δ → ∞. When λ = 1/2 or δ = 0, there is no incentive
conflict between the division managers or between them and headquarters and, as a result, first
best expected profits are realized under both structures. The result that the two structures
30Since both ΠC and ΠD are proportional in

σ21 + σ22

setting

σ21 + σ22

= 1 is without loss of generality.
31For the Delegation Principle see, for instance, Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
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perform equally well when δ → ∞ is an immediate consequence of the fact that decision making
and communication under the two structures both converge in the limit in which coordination
becomes all important, as was shown previously. The next proposition compares the relative
performance of the two organizational structures more formally.
PROPOSITION 5 (Centralization versus Decentralization). Suppose that λ > 1/2 and δ > 0:
i. λ small: if λ ∈ (1/2, 17/28) , then Decentralization strictly dominates Centrali-
zation.
ii. δ small: if δ ∈
¡
0, δ
¢
, then Decentralization strictly dominates Centralization,
where δ > 0 is defined in the proof .
iii. δ and λ large: if δ ∈
¡
δ,∞
¢
, then Decentralization strictly dominates Centralization
for all λ ∈
£
17/28, λ(δ)
¢
and Centralization strictly dominates Decentrali-
zation for all λ ∈
¡
λ(δ), 1
¤
, where λ(δ) > 17/28 is defined in the proof.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 6 and summarizes the main insights that we discussed
above. We now turn to the intuition for the main results reported in the proposition.
Small λ The first part of Proposition 5 shows that when the own-division bias λ > 1/2 is suﬃ-
ciently small, the adaptation advantage of the decentralized structure outweighs the coordination
advantage of the centralized one. In particular, it shows that this is the case even when the im-
portance of coordination is arbitrarily high. To understand this, note that when the own-division
bias is small, the ineﬃciency of decentralized decision making is very limited and, as a result, the
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Figure 6: Organizational Performance in Two Dimensions
relative organizational performance of the two structures is determined entirely by the diﬀerences
in the quality of horizontal and vertical communication. Note next that the more important coor-
dination, the better horizontal communication and thus the easier it is for the division managers
to coordinate their decisions. In contrast, an increase in the need for coordination worsens ver-
tical communication which makes it more diﬃcult for headquarters to adapt the decisions to the
local information. As coordination becomes more important, the coordination advantage of the
centralized structure therefore becomes smaller and smaller relative to the adaptation advantage of
the decentralized structure. As a result, Decentralization outperforms Centralization even when
coordination is very important.
To see this more formally, recall that the diﬀerence in the expected profits between the two
organizational structures is given by (17), where ∆AL is the adaptation advantage of the decen-
tralized structure and ∆CL is the coordination advantage of the centralized structure. At λ = 1/2
there is no incentive conflict between the division managers and between them and headquarters.
As a result, the two structures perform equally well in terms of coordination and adaptation, that
is, ∆CL = ∆AL = 0. Consider now the eﬀect of a marginal increase in the own-division bias:
d (ΠC −ΠD)
dλ
=
∂ΠC
∂SC
∂SC
∂λ
− ∂ΠD
∂SD
∂SD
∂λ
= −d∆AL
dλ
+ 2δ
d∆CL
dλ
for λ = 1/2.
The first equality shows that, at λ = 1/2, an increase in the own-division bias only aﬀects the relative
performance of the two organizational structures through its eﬀect on the quality of communication.
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Small changes in decision making do not have a first order eﬀect on the expected profits since
decision making is eﬃcient at λ = 1/2. The second equality shows that the eﬀect of an increase
in the own-division bias can be decomposed into its eﬀect on the adaptation advantage of the
decentralized structure and the coordination advantage of the centralized one. In particular,
an increase in the own-division bias worsens vertical communication which hinders the ability
of headquarters to adapt the decisions to the local circumstances. As a result, the adaptation
advantage of the decentralized structure increases, that is, d∆AL/dλ > 0 for all δ ∈ (0,∞). An
increase in the own-division bias also worsens horizontal communication which hinders the ability of
the division managers to coordinate and, as a result, the coordination advantage of the centralized
structure increases, that is, d∆CL/dλ > 0 for all δ ∈ (0,∞). Overall, the adverse eﬀect on the
ability of headquarters to adapt outweighs the adverse eﬀect on the division managers’ ability to
coordinate. In other words, when λ = 1/2, d∆AL/dλ > 2δd∆CL/dλ for all δ ∈ (0,∞) and thus
d (ΠC −ΠD) /dλ < 0. Since ΠC − ΠD = 0 for λ = 1/2, this implies that ΠC − ΠD < 0 when
λ > 1/2 is suﬃciently small.
Small δ The second part of Proposition 5 shows that when the need for coordination is suﬃciently
small, the decentralized structure outperforms the centralized one, independent of the division
managers’ bias. Essentially, even when the need for coordination is very small, communication
is noisy under both structures. Under Centralization this aﬀects the ability of headquarters to
adapt the decisions to the local conditions while under Decentralization it aﬀects the ability of
the of division managers to coordinate their actions. Since for small δ coordination is much less
important than adaptation, the centralized structure suﬀers more from imperfect communication
than the decentralized one does. As a result, Decentralization dominates Centralization.
To see this more formally, consider the relative performance of the two structures in the neigh-
borhood of δ = 0. Clearly, when δ = 0 there is no incentive conflict between the division managers
or between them and headquarters and, as a result, ΠC − ΠD = 0. Consider now the eﬀect of a
marginal increase in the need for coordination on the relative performance of the two structures
which can be obtained by diﬀerentiating (17):
d (ΠC −ΠD)
dδ
= −d∆AL
dδ
for δ = 0. (18)
This expression shows that at δ = 0 the eﬀect of a marginal increase in δ on ΠC−ΠD depends only
on how such an increase aﬀects the adaptation advantage of the decentralized structure. This is so
since the coordination advantage ∆CL and the weight 2δ on this advantage are both equal to zero.
To understand the eﬀect of an increase in the need for coordination on the adaptation advantage,
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recall that such an increase worsens vertical communication which limits the ability of headquarters
to adapt the decisions to the states. The ability of the division managers to adapt their decisions,
in contrast, is unaﬀected by any changes in the quality of horizontal communication since these
managers observe their own states directly themselves. It is therefore intuitive that at δ = 0 an
increase in the need for coordination increases the adaptation advantage, that is, d∆AL/dδ > 0.
Formally, for δ = 0 and λ > 1/2,
d (ΠC −ΠD)
dδ
= −d∆AL
dδ
= −
∙
∂ALC
∂SC
∂SC
∂δ
− ∂ALD
∂SD
∂SD
∂δ
¸
= −∂ALC
∂SC
dSC
dδ
< 0.
Since, for δ = 0 and λ > 1/2, ΠC −ΠD = 0 and d (ΠC −ΠD) /dδ < 0, the decentralized structure
outperforms the centralized one in the neighborhood of δ = 0.
Large δ and λ The first two parts of Proposition 5 show that the decentralized structure out-
performs the centralized one when either the division managers are not very biased or coordination
is not very important. The third part, in contrast, shows that the centralized structure tends to
outperform the decentralized one when the division managers are suﬃciently biased and coordina-
tion is suﬃciently important. In particular, for any δ ∈
¡
δ,∞
¢
, Centralization strictly outperforms
Decentralization when the own-division bias is suﬃciently large. There are two reasons for this.
First, when division managers are very biased, vertical communication is a lot more eﬃcient than
horizontal communication, as can be seen in Figure 3. Second, since increases in the own-division
bias distort decision making by the division managers but not by headquarters, decision making
under Centralization is significantly more eﬃcient than decision making under Decentralization
when the own-division bias is large. It is because of these two factors that Centralization tends
to outperform Decentralization when the division managers are very biased and coordination is
important.
7 Empirical Implications and Evidence
In principle, the main predictions of the model could be tested using cross-sectional data. For this
purpose one would need information about how balanced the incentives of division managers are,
that is, how much their compensation depends on divisional rather than firm wide profits. One
would also require information about the need for coordination between divisions and the organi-
zational structure of firms. With such data, one could test the predictions that are summarized in
Proposition 5 and illustrated in Figure 6. First, for a given need for coordination, there should, in
general, be a positive relationship between the own-division bias and the degree to which firms are
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centralized. Second, for a given own-division bias, there should, in general, be a positive relation-
ship between the need for coordination and the degree of centralization. Third, the first correlation
— between the own-division bias and the degree of centralization — should only hold if the need for
coordination is suﬃciently high. Similarly, the second correlation — between the need for coordina-
tion and the degree of centralization — should only hold if division managers are suﬃciently biased
towards their own divisions. Firms in which coordination between divisions is not very important,
or in which the incentives of division managers are very balanced, should be mostly decentralized.
While the model can be potentially tested using cross-sectional data, a more fruitful approach
might be to exploit exogenous variation in the need for coordination in a group of firms. To illustrate
the panel data implications of the model, suppose that a technological innovation increases the scope
for inter-divisional coordination in an industry in which a group of firms is active.32 Suppose also
that, due to exogenous diﬀerences in the needs to motivate division-specific eﬀorts, the incentive
contracts of division managers diﬀer across firms in how much weight they put on divisional and
firm wide profits.33 The model then predicts that, in response to the technological innovation, the
probability of a reorganization, in particular a move towards centralization, should be higher in
firms in which division managers are biased towards their own divisions than in firms in which they
are less biased.
We are not aware of any existing econometric studies that investigate these types of predictions.
There is, however, some informal evidence that is consistent with a basic implication of the model.
In particular, it appears that successful decentralization tends to require the balancing of the
division managers’ incentives. Before 1918, for instance, GM was essentially a holding company
of independent firms in which “division managers had contracts providing them with a stated
share in the profits of their own divisions, irrespective of how much the corporation as a whole
earned. Inevitably, this system exaggerated the self-interest of each division at the expense of the
interests of the corporation itself. It was even possible for a division manager to act contrary to the
interests of the corporation in his eﬀort to maximize his own division’s profits.”34 As discussed in
the Introduction, GM dealt with these problems of decentralization by establishing various inter-
divisional committees that facilitated horizontal communication. Equally important, however, was
the introduction of a new incentive scheme that balanced the division mangers’ incentives. In
32Technological innovations in the 1980s and early 90s, for example, lead to the rise of the ‘platform design process’
which allowed multinational car manufacturers to “reap global economies of scale on the parts that can be produced
in common for multiple regions of the world and to be locally responsive on those features where such responsiveness
is valued” (Hannan, Podolny and Roberts 1999, p.2).
33 In the Conclusions we discuss how a version of our model in which division managers need to make division-specific
eﬀort decisions can be used to endogenize the own-division bias.
34Sloan (1964), p.409.
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particular, GM adopted the General Motors Bonus Plan which asserted that “each individual
should be rewarded in proportion to his contribution to the profit of his own division and of the
corporation as a whole.”35 According to Alfred Sloan, “the Bonus Plan played almost as big a role
as our system of co-ordination in making decentralization work eﬀectively.”36
British Petroleum provides another example of the importance of balancing incentives in de-
centralized firms. In the early 1990s the oil and gas exploration division, known as BPX, was
headed by John Browne, who later became BP’s chief executive. He decentralized BPX, creating
almost fifty semi-autonomous business units. Initially, since “business unit leaders were personally
accountable for their units’ performance, they focused primarily on the success of their own busi-
nesses rather than on the success of BPX as a whole.”37 To encourage coordination between the
business units, BPX established peer groups which were similar to the committees in GM and were
intended as forums in which the heads of the diﬀerent business units could exchange information
and ideas. Also as in the case of GM, BPX complemented the introduction of these peer groups
by changes in the implicit and explicit incentives of business unit leaders to reward and promote
them not just based on the success of their own division but also for contributing to the successes
of other business units. As a result, “‘Lone stars’ — those who deliver outstanding business unit
performance but engage in little cross-unit collaboration — can survive within BP, but their careers
typically plateau.”38
8 Asymmetric Organizations
A key feature of our model is the symmetry of the organization: the two divisions are of equal size,
they have the same need for coordination and the two decisions are made simultaneously. In this
section we relax the symmetry assumptions and investigate how asymmetries between the divisions
aﬀect the relative performance of centralized and decentralized organizations. We show that while
such asymmetries tend to favor Centralization, our central result — that Decentralization can be
optimal even when coordination is very important — continues to hold, albeit in a weaker form.
Since the analyses of the diﬀerent extensions are very similar, we focus on just one asymmetry,
namely sequential decision making. Diﬀerences in the importance of coordination and in the
division sizes are briefly discussed at the end of this section. The formal analyses of all three
extensions are contained in Appendices B, C and D.
35Sloan (1964), p.407.
36Sloan (1964), p.409.
37Hansen and von Oetinger (2001), p.3.
38Hansen and von Oetinger (2001), p.8.
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8.1 Sequential Decision Making
In some settings one division manager may have a first mover advantage, that is, he may be able
to make his decision before the other division managers can do so. To explore this possibility, we
now consider a version of our model in which decision making under Decentralization takes place
sequentially. In particular, suppose that Manager 1 is the Leader and Manager 2 the Follower.
After both division managers have observed their local conditions, the Follower sends a single
message to the Leader. Next the Leader makes his decision, the Follower observes it and then
makes his own.
Sequential decision making eliminates the Follower’s uncertainty about the Leader’s decision.
As such, it might seem that sequential decision making facilitates coordination and thus further
strengthens the result that Decentralization can be optimal even when coordination is very impor-
tant. This, however, is not the case. To see this, consider Figure 7 which illustrates the relative
performance of Centralization and Decentralization with sequential decision making when σ21 = σ
2
2.
It can be seen that when coordination is suﬃciently important, Centralization strictly dominates
Decentralization with sequential decision making for any λ > 1/2. There are two reasons for the
result that sequential decision making tends to favor Centralization. First, when decision making
takes place sequentially the Leader adapts his decision more closely to his local conditions since he
knows that the Follower will be forced to adjust his decision accordingly. As a result, decisions can
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be less coordinated under sequential than under simultaneous decision making. Second, because
the Leader adapts his decision more closely to his state, the Follower has a stronger incentive to
misrepresent his information so as to influence the Leader’s decision making. As a result, commu-
nication under sequential decision making is worse than under simultaneous decision making. The
Leader is therefore less well informed about what decision the Follower is going to make than he
would be under simultaneous decision making. Other things equal, this tends to make coordination
more diﬃcult.
While sequential decision making weakens our result that Decentralization can be optimal even
when coordination is very important it does not eliminate it altogether. To see this, consider first
Figure 7. While this figure shows that for any λ > 1/2, Centralization dominates Decentralization
when the need for coordination δ is large enough, it also shows that, for any δ > 0, Decentralization
dominates Centralization when the own-division bias λ > 1/2 is small enough. Thus, it is still
the case that Decentralization dominates Centralization provided that the division managers are
not too biased towards their own divisions. The case for Decentralization is even stronger if the
Leader has more private information than the Follower, in the sense that σ21 > σ
2
2. This can be
seen in Figure 8 which illustrates the relative performance of Centralization and Decentralization
for diﬀerent values of R ≡ σ21/
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
. Essentially, the bigger σ21 relative to σ
2
2, the more the
organization benefits from the perfect communication of θ1 under Decentralization with sequential
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decision making, and thus the better Decentralization performs relative to Centralization.
8.2 Other Asymmetries
In some organizations divisions diﬀer in how much their profits depend on coordination. The
optimal design of such organizations has recently been analyzed in Rantakari (2006). In Appendix
C, we consider a model that follows Rantakari (2006) in allowing the divisions to have diﬀerent
needs for coordination. We show that for any λ > 1/2, Centralization dominates Decentralization
when coordination becomes suﬃciently important for one of the divisions. Importantly, however,
it is still the case that, for any need for coordination, Decentralization dominates Centralization
when the own-division bias λ > 1/2 is suﬃciently small. Our central result therefore continues to
hold in this extension.
A similar result holds if divisions have the same need for coordination but diﬀer in their sizes.
In Appendix D we consider a model in which the profits of Divisions 1 and 2 are given by 2απ1 and
2 (1− α)π2, where α ∈ (1/2, 1) is a parameter that measures the relative size of the two divisions.
Once again it can be shown that for any λ > 1/2, Centralization dominates Decentralization if
coordination is suﬃciently important. However, it is still the case that Decentralization always
dominates Centralization in the neighborhood of λ = 1/2, provided that α is not ‘too big,’ Thus,
our central result continues to hold in asymmetric organizations, albeit in a weaker form.
9 Conclusions
When does coordination require centralization? In this paper we addressed this question in a model
in which information about the costs of coordination is dispersed among division managers who
communicate strategically to promote their own divisions at the expense of the overall organization.
We showed that vertical communication is more eﬃcient than horizontal communication: division
managers share more information with an unbiased headquarters than they do with each other.
However, the diﬀerence in the quality of the two modes of communication diminishes, and eventually
vanishes, as coordination becomes more important. As a result, decentralization can be optimal
even if coordination is very important. In particular, in symmetric organizations — in which
divisions are of equal size and have the same need for coordination and in which decisions are made
simultaneously — decentralization always outperforms centralization when the division managers’
incentives are suﬃciently aligned. The same result also holds in asymmetric organizations in which
decisions are made sequentially or in which the divisions diﬀer in their need for coordination. In
organizations in which the divisions diﬀer in terms of their size the result also holds as long as the
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size diﬀerence is not too large.
The analysis of our model is surprisingly simple and, arguably, more tractable than the leading
example in Crawford and Sobel (1982), the traditional workhorse for cheap talk applications. This
is so since in our setting the eﬃcient communication equilibrium is one in which the number of
intervals goes to infinity. As a result, one can avoid the integer problem that is associated with
the finite interval equilibria in the standard model. We hope that our framework will prove useful
in approaching various applied problems ranging from organizational design, the theory of the firm
to fiscal federalism.
Our central result — that decentralization can be optimal even if coordination is very important
— is reminiscent of Hayek (1945) and the many economists since who have invoked the presence of
‘local knowledge’ as a reason to decentralize decision making in organizations. In the management
literature, this view has become known as the Delegation Principle.39 Our insight diﬀers from the
standard Delegation Principle rationale on two important dimensions.
First, the standard argument posits that eﬃcient decision making requires the delegation of
decision rights to those managers who possess the relevant information. The alternative — commu-
nicating the relevant information to those who possess the decision rights — is discarded on the basis
of physical communication constraints (Jensen and Meckling 1992). Is the local knowledge argu-
ment still relevant in a world in which technological advances have slashed communication costs?
Our analysis suggests that it is: even in the absence of any physical communication costs, local
knowledge remains a powerful force for decentralization. The same factors that make decentraliza-
tion of decision rights unattractive — biased incentives of the local managers — are even more harmful
for the transfer of information. As long as division managers are not too biased, the distortion of
information in a centralized organization outweighs the loss of control under decentralization.
Second, the standard rationale for the Delegation Principle presumes that decentralization
eliminates the need for communication. If, however, decision relevant information is dispersed
among multiple managers — as is likely to be the case when decisions need to be coordinated
— then eﬃcient decision making always requires communication. Our analysis has highlighted
that while local knowledge gives division managers an information advantage, headquarters has a
communication advantage. As a result, headquarters can actually be a more eﬃcient aggregator of
dispersed information. Despite the need for information aggregation, we show that decentralization
is often preferred, even if coordination is very important. The reason is that as coordination and
information aggregation become more important, division managers communicate more eﬃciently
39See, for instance, Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
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with each other. As a result, the diﬀerence in the quality of horizontal and vertical communication
diminishes and eventually disappears.
A simplifying assumption in our model is that the own-division bias is exogenously given and
independent of the organizational structure. A natural extension would be to endogenize the own-
division bias by allowing the firm to design the compensation schemes of the division managers.
Perhaps the simplest way to do this would be to suppose that the division managers are risk averse
and liquidity constrained and that each one has to make a binary eﬀort choice that aﬀects the
profits of his division. In such a setting the firm needs to give the division managers a share of
divisional profits to motivate eﬀort. In principle it could then induce truth-telling and eﬃcient
decision making by giving each division manager an equal share in the profits of the other division.
Since division managers are liquidity constrained, however, the firm may find it optimal to give each
division manager a smaller share in the other division’s profit than in those of his own division.
In the context of such an extension, a key feature of our model is that the benefit of reducing
the division managers’ own-division bias — in terms of improved communication and, in the case
of decentralization, improved decision making — tends to be larger in decentralized organizations
than in centralized ones and it tends to be larger in organizations in which coordination is more
important. As a result, we conjecture that the result that decentralization can be optimal even
when coordination is very important continues to hold in such an extension.
The extension with endogenous compensation also underlines the importance of controlling for
the need for coordination when empirically investigating the relationship between organizational
structure and the own-division bias of division managers. In the main model analyzed in this paper,
there is a positive relationship between the own-division bias and the degree of centralization when
the need for coordination is high while decentralization is optimal for any own-division bias when
the need for coordination is low. We conjecture that in the model with endogenous incentives it
is still the case that there is a positive relationship between the own-division bias and the degree
of centralization when the need for coordination is high. When the need for coordination is low,
however, it is now optimal to delegate the decision rights to division managers who are mainly
compensated for the success of their own divisions. In such a model, therefore, one would expect
to see decentralized organizations with very biased division managers when coordination is not
important and to see decentralized organizations with fairly unbiased division managers when
coordination is important.
Beyond its implications for organizational design, it is tempting to interpret our theory as
one of horizontal firm boundaries. To do so, however, one would have to address the diﬀerence
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between a decentralized multi-divisional firm and several independent single-division firms. One
diﬀerence, emphasized in Holmström (1999) and, informally, in Roberts (2004), is that the owners
of a multi-divisional firm can use a much wider array of tools to align the incentives of their division
managers than the owners of independent firms can use to align the incentives of their managers
across firm boundaries.40 This suggests that multi-divisional firms exist to ensure coordination by
either centralizing decision rights in a powerful headquarters or, as in the GM and BP examples,
by providing balanced incentives for the managers in charge of decentralized divisions. Indepen-
dent, single division firms, in contrast, sacrifice coordination for the benefits of the high-powered
incentives provided by the market. A model of firm boundaries along these lines awaits future
research.
40See Roberts (2004), pp.106-115.
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10 Appendix A
We first define the random variable mi as the posterior expectation of the state θi by the receiver
of message mi. The following lemma will be used throughout the appendix.
LEMMA A1. For any communication equilibrium considered in Proposition 1 Eθ2 [m1m2] =
Eθ2 [θ1m2] = Eθ2 [θ2] = Eθ2 [m2] = Eθ2 [θ1θ2] = 0 and Eθ1 [m1m2] = Eθ1 [θ2m1] = Eθ1 [θ1] =
Eθ1 ([m1]) = Eθ2 [θ1θ2] = 0.
Proof: All equalities follow from independence of θ1 and θ2 and that in equilibrium Eθi [mi] =
Eθi [θi] = 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: We first note that in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the com-
munication game, optimal decisions given beliefs satisfy (3) and (4) for the case of Centralization
and (8) and (9) for the case of Decentralization. Now we will establish that communication rules
in equilibrium are interval equilibria.
For the case of Centralization let μ2(·) be any communication rule for Manager 2. The expected
utility of Manager 1 if the Headquarter Manager holds a posterior expectation ν1 of θ1 is given by
Eθ2 [U1 | θ1, ν] = −Eθ2
∙
λ
³bdC1 − θ1´2 + (1− λ)³bdC2 − θ2´2 + δ ³bdC1 − bdC2 ´2¸ , (19)
with
bdC1 ≡ γCν1 + (1− γC) E [θ2 | μ2(·)] (20)bdC2 ≡ (1− γC) ν1 + γCE [θ2 | μ2(·)] . (21)
It is readily seen that ∂
2
∂θ1∂ν1Eθ2 [U1 | θ1, ν1] > 0 and ∂
2
∂2θ1
Eθ2 [U1 | θ1, ν1] < 0. This implies
that for any two diﬀerent posterior expectations of the Headquarter Manager, say ν1 < ν1, there
is at most one type of Manager 1 that is indiﬀerent between both. Now suppose that contrary
to the assertion of interval equilibria there are two states θ11 < θ
2
1 such that Eθ2
£
U1 | θ11, ν1
¤
≥
Eθ2
£
U1 | θ11, ν1
¤
and Eθ2
£
U1 | θ21, ν1
¤
> Eθ2
£
U1 | θ21, ν1
¤
. But then Eθ2
£
U1 | θ21, ν1
¤
−Eθ2
£
U1 | θ21, ν1
¤
<
Eθ2
£
U1 | θ11, ν1
¤
− Eθ2
£
U1 | θ11, ν1
¤
which violates ∂
2
∂θ1∂ν1
Eθ2 [U1 | θ1, ν1] > 0 . The same argument
can be applied to Manager 2 for any reporting strategy μ1(·) of Manager 1. Therefore all equilibria
of the communication game under Centralization must be interval equilibria.
For the case of Decentralization let μ1(·) and μ2(·) be communication rules of Manager 1
and Manager 2. Sequential rationality implies that in equilibrium decision rules must conform
to (8) and (9). If ν1 denotes the expectation of the posterior of θ1 that Manager 2 holds then
∂2
∂θ1∂ν1Eθ2 [U1 | θ1, ν1] > 0 and the proof follows as in the preceding paragraph.
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We now characterize all finite equilibria of the communication game, that is, equilibria that
induce a finite number of diﬀerent decisions. For this purpose for Manager j let aj be a partition
of [−sj , sj ], any message mj ∈ (aj,i−1, aj,i) be denoted by mj,i and mj,i be the receiver’s posterior
belief of the expected value of θj after receiving message mj,i.
a. Centralization: In state a1,i Manager 1 must be indiﬀerent between sending a message that
induces a posteriorm1,i and a posteriorm1,i+1 so that Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i]−Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i+1] = 0.
Using Lemma A1 on (19) we have that
Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i]− Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i+1]
= λ (γCm1,i+1 − a1,i)2 + (1− λ) (1− γC)2m21,i+1 + δ (2γC − 1)2m21,i+1
−
³
λ (γCm1,i − a1,i)2 + (1− λ) (1− γC)2m21,i + δ (2γC − 1)2m21,i
´
.
Substituting m1,i = (a1,i−1 + a1,i) /2 we have that Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i] − Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i+1] = 0
if and only if a1,i = (a1,i−1 + a1,i+1) / (2 + 4bC), where bC is defined in (11). Rearranging this
expression, we get
a1,i+1 − a1,i = a1,i − a1,i−1 + 4bCa1,i. (22)
Let the total number of elements of a1 be N . Equilibrium with an even number of elements
would correspond to the case N = 2N1, and N = 2N1+1 when the equilibrium has an odd number
of elements. Using the boundary conditions a1,0 = −s1 and a1,N = s1 to solve the diﬀerence
equation (22) gives
a1,i =
s1¡
xNC − yNC
¢ ¡xiC(1 + yNC )− yiC(1 + xNC )¢ for 0 ≤ i ≤ N, (23)
where the roots xC and yC are given by xC = (1 + 2bC) +
q
(1 + 2bC)
2 − 1 and yC = (1 + 2bC)−q
(1 + 2bC)
2 − 1 and satisfy xC yC = 1, with xC > 1. It is readily seen that for each k ≤ N,
a1,k = a1,N−k, that is, the intervals are symmetrically distributed around zero. When N = 2N1,
i.e. the partition has an even number of elements, then a1,N
2
= 0. In this case we can compactly
write (23) as
a1,i =
s1³
xN1C − y
N1
C
´(xiC − yiC) for 0 ≤ i ≤ N1.
For an equilibrium with an odd number of elements N = 2N1 +1 there is a symmetric interval
around zero where the Headquarter Manager’s expected posterior of θ1 is zero. In this case we can
compactly write (23) as
a1,i =
s1³
x2N1+1C − y
2N1+1
C
´ ³xiC(xN1C + yN1+1C )− yiC(xN1+1C + yN1C ))´ for 1 ≤ i ≤ N1.
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The analysis for Manager 2 is analogous.
b. Decentralization: If Manager 1 observes state θ1 and sends message m1,i that induces a
posterior belief m1,i in Manager 2 his expected utility is given by
Eθ2 [U1 | θ1,m1,i] = −Eθ2
h
λ
¡
dD1 − θ1
¢2
+ (1− λ)
¡
dD2 − θ2
¢2
+ δ
¡
dD1 − dD2
¢2i
, (24)
where dD1 and d
D
2 are given by (8) and (9). It must again be the case that Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i] −
Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i+1] = 0. Making use of Lemma A1 on (24) we have that
Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i]− Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i+1]
=
Ã
λδ2
(m1,i+1δ − (λ+ 2δ) a1,i)2
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
+ (1− λ)
δ2m21,i+1
(λ+ 2δ)2
+ δ
λ2 (m1,i+1δ − (λ+ 2δ) a1,i)2
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
!
−
Ã
λδ2
(m1,iδ − (λ+ 2δ) a1,i)2
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
+ (1− λ)
δ2m21,i
(λ+ 2δ)2
+ δ
λ2 (m1,iδ − (λ+ 2δ) a1,i)2
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
!
.
Substitutingm1,i = (a1,i−1 + a1,i) /2 andm1,i+1 = (a1,i + a1,i+1) /2we have that Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i]−
Eθ2 [U1 | a1,i,m1,i+1] = 0 if and only if a1,i = (a1,i−1 + a1,i+1) / (2 + 4bD), where bD is defined in
(12). Rearranging this expression, we get
a1,i+1 − a1,i = a1,i − a1,i−1 + 4bDa1,i. (25)
Using the boundary conditions a1,0 = −s1 and a1,N = s1 to solve the diﬀerence equation (25) gives
a1,i =
s1¡
xND − yND
¢ ¡xiD(1 + yND )− yiD(1 + xND)¢ for j = 1, 2 and 0 ≤ i ≤ N, (26)
where the roots xD and yD are given by xD = (1 + 2bD) +
q
(1 + 2bD)
2 − 1 and yD = (1 + 2bD)−q
(1 + 2bD)
2 − 1 and satisfy xD yD = 1, with xD > 1. It is readily seen that for each k ≤ N,
a1,k = a1,N−k, that is, the intervals are symmetrically distributed around zero. When N = 2N1,
i.e. the partition has an even number of elements, then a1,N
2
= 0. In this case we can compactly
write (26) as
a1,i =
s1³
xN1D − y
N1
D
´ ¡xiD − yiD)¢ for 0 ≤ i ≤ N1.
For an equilibrium with an odd number of elements N = 2N1 + 1 there is a symmetric interval
around zero where the Headquarter Manager’s expected posterior is zero. In this case we can
compactly write (26) as
a1,i =
s1³
x2N1+1D − y
2N1+1
D
´ ³xiD(xN1D + yN1+1D )− yiD(xN1+1D + yN1D ))´ for 1 ≤ i ≤ N1.
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The analysis for Manager 2 is analogous. ¥
For the proof of Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 we will make use of the following lemma:
LEMMA A2. i. E [mjθj ] = E
h
m2j
i
for j = 1, 2. ii. E
h
m2j
i
is strictly increasing in the number
of intervals Nj for j = 1, 2. and
E
£
m2j
¤
=
s2j
4
⎡
⎢⎣
³
x3NjC − 1
´
(xC − 1)2³
xNjC − 1
´3 ¡
x2C + xC + 1
¢ − xNjC (xC + 1)2
xC
³
xNjC − 1
´2
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Proof: i. Given the equilibrium reporting strategies we have that mj = E [θj |θj ∈ (aj,i−1, aj,i) ] for
j = 1, 2, which implies
E([mjθj ] = E [E [mjθj |θj ∈ (aj,i−1, aj,i) ]] = E [mjE [θj |θj ∈ (aj,i−1, aj,i) ]] = E
£
m2j
¤
.
ii. Using (23) we can compute E(m2j ) as follows
E
£
m2j
¤
=
1
2sj
X
Nj
Z aj,i
aj,i−1
µ
aj,i + aj,i−1
2
¶2
dθj =
1
8s1
X
Nj
(aj,i − aj,i−1) (aj,i + aj,i−1)2
=
s2j
8
³
xNjC − y
Nj
C
´3X
Nj
{
³
1 + yNjC
´3
x3(i−1)C (xC + 1)
2(xC − 1)
+
³
1 + xNjC
´3
y3(i−1)C (yC + 1)
2(1− yC) +
³
1 + xNjC
´3
y3(i−1)C (yC + 1)
2(1− yC)
+
³
1 + yNjC
´³
1 + xNjC
´2
yi−1C (y
2
C − 1)(xC + 1)−
³
1 + yNjC
´2 ³
1 + xNjC
´
xi−1C (x
2
C − 1)(yC + 1)}.
Performing the summation in the above expression and using the fact that xC yC = 1 we get
after some lengthy calculations that
E
£
m2j
¤
=
s2j
4
⎡
⎢⎣
³
x3NjC − 1
´
(xC − 1)2³
xNjC − 1
´3 ¡
x2C + xC + 1
¢ −
³
xNjC + 1
´2
(yC + 1)(xC + 1)
xNjC
³
xNjC − y
Nj
C
´2
⎤
⎥⎦ = (27)
=
s2j
4
⎡
⎢⎣
³
x3NjC − 1
´
(xC − 1)2³
xNjC − 1
´3 ¡
x2C + xC + 1
¢ − xNjC (xC + 1)2
xC
³
xNjC − 1
´2
⎤
⎥⎦ .
To see that E
h
m2j
i
is strictly increasing in Nj first define
f(p) =
p3 − 1
(p− 1)3
(xC − 1)2¡
x2C + xC + 1
¢ − p
(p− 1)2
(xC + 1)2
xC
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and note that
f 0(p) = −3 p+ 1
(p− 1)3
(xC − 1)2¡
x2C + xC + 1
¢ + p+ 1
(p− 1)3
(xC + 1)2
xC
=
=
p+ 1
(p− 1)3
10x2C + x
4
C + 1
xC
¡
x2C + xC + 1
¢ .
Therefore f 0(p) > 0 for p > 1. Since E
h
m2j
i
=
s2j
4 f(x
Nj
C ) this establishes that E
h
m2j
i
is strictly
increasing in Nj . ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: First we establish that the limit of strategy profiles and beliefs (μ1(·),
μ2(·) , d1(·), d2(·), g1(·), g2(·)) asN1, N2 →∞ denoted by (μ∞1 (·), μ∞2 (·) , d∞1 (·), d∞2 (·), g∞1 (·), g∞2 (·))
is indeed a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the communication game, both under Centralization and
under Decentralization. To this end we need only verify that the reporting strategies of Manager
1 and Manager 2 are a best response to (d∞1 (·), d∞2 (·)). Now suppose there is a θj that induces an
expected posterior m1 in the decision maker and has a profitable deviation by inducing a diﬀerent
expected posterior m2 associated with state θ0j . But then there exists a finite Nj such that θj has
a profitable deviation by inducing the same posterior that θ0j contradicting the fact that strategy
profiles and beliefs (μ1(·), μ2(·) , d1(·), d2(·), g1(·), g2(·)) constitute an equilibrium for all finite Nj .
Thus θj cannot profitably deviate and therefore the reporting strategies (μ∞1 (·), μ∞2 (·)) are a best
response to (d∞1 (·), d∞2 (·)). The fact that the expected profit under the equilibrium with an infinite
number of elements for Manager 1 and Manager 2 coincides with the limit of the expected profit
obtains by applying the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem to the expression of Πl with
l = {C,D} .
Finally, we show that the equilibrium (μ∞1 (·), μ∞2 (·), d∞1 (·), d∞2 (·), g∞1 (·), g∞2 (·)) yields higher
total expected profits than all finite equilibria.
a. Centralization: The expected profits under Centralization are given by
ΠC = −E
h¡
dC1 − θ1
¢2
+
¡
dC2 − θ2
¢2
+ 2δ
¡
dC1 − dC2
¢2i
. (28)
Using (3), (4) and Lemmas A1 and A2-i. we have that for given N1, N2
E
h¡
dC1 − θ1
¢2i
= σ21 − γC (2− γC) Eθ1
¡
m21
¢
+ (1− γC)2 Eθ2
¡
m22
¢
(29)
E
h¡
dC2 − θ2
¢2i
= σ22 + (1− γC)2 Eθ1
¡
m21
¢
− γC (2− γC) Eθ2
¡
m22
¢
E
h¡
dC1 − dC2
¢2i
= (2γC − 1)2
¡
Eθ1
¡
m21
¢
+Eθ2
¡
m22
¢¢
.
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The rate at which total profits change with the variance of the messages Eθj
³
m2j
´
is given by
∂ΠC
∂Eθj
h
m2j
i = (1 + 2δ) (2γC − 1) .
Since γC >
1
2 we have that
∂ΠC
∂Eθj [m
2
j ]
> 0. From Lemma A.2-ii we have that Eθj
h
m2j
i
increases
with Nj and therefore expected profits ΠC increase as the number of elements Nj in the partition
of Manager j increases.
b. Decentralization: The expected profits under Decentralization are given by
ΠD = −E
h¡
dD1 − θ1
¢2
+
¡
dD2 − θ2
¢2
+ 2δ
¡
dD1 − dD2
¢2i
. (30)
Using (8), (9) and Lemmas A1 and A2-i. we have that for given N1, N2
E
h¡
dD1 − θ1
¢2i
=
δ2
(λ+ δ)2
σ21 − δ3
2λ+ 3δ
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
Eθ1
£
m21
¤
+
δ2
(λ+ 2δ)2
Eθ2
£
m22
¤
(31)
E
h¡
dD2 − θ2
¢2i
=
δ2
(λ+ δ)2
σ22 +
δ2
(λ+ 2δ)2
Eθ1
£
m21
¤
− δ3 2λ+ 3δ
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
Eθ2
£
m22
¤
E
h¡
dD1 − dD2
¢2i
=
λ2
(λ+ δ)2
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
− λ2δ 2λ+ 3δ
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
¡
Eθ1
£
m21
¤
+Eθ2
£
m22
¤¢
.
The rate at which total profits change with the variance of the messages Eθj
³
m2j
´
is
∂ΠD
∂Eθj
h
m2j
i = λ2δ2
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
Ã
6δ − 1 + 4λ+ 2
µ
δ
λ
¶2!
.
Since λ > 12 we have that
∂ΠD
∂Eθj [m
2
j ]
> 0. From Lemma A.2-ii we have that Eθj
³
m2j
´
increases
with Nj and therefore ΠD increases as the number of elements Nj in the partition of Manager j
increases. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1: Taking limits to each term on the RHS of (27) we obtain
lim
Nj→∞
³
x3NjC − 1
´
(xC − 1)2³
xNjC − 1
´3 ¡
x2C + xC + 1
¢ = xC − 1x2C + xC + 1
lim
Nj→∞
xNjC (xC + 1)
2
xC
³
xNjC − 1
´2 = 0.
Therefore
lim
Nj→∞
E
£
m2j
¤
=
s21
4
(xC + 1)
2¡
x2C + xC + 1
¢ = s21 1 + bC3 + 4bC = (1− SC)σ2j
40
where SC = bC/(3 + 4bC). Finally, using Lemma A2-i we have that
E
h
(θj − E [θj |mj ])2
i
= σ2j − E
£
m2j
¤
= SCσ2j .
The analysis for Decentralization is analogous (one just needs to replace C with D in the above
expressions). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: (i.) From (11) and (12) it follows immediately that for λ = 1/2 bD =
bC = 0 and SC = SD = 0. Furthermore, since the function b/(3 + 4b) is strictly increasing in b it
suﬃces to show that, whenever λ > 1/2, bD > bC . Since 1/2 ≤ λ ≤ 1 then λ+ δ > λ+ δ − λ2 > 0
and taking the ratio of bD and bC we have
bD
bC
=
(λ+ δ) (λ+ δ)
δ
¡
λ+ δ − λ2
¢ > 1.
(ii.) By directly diﬀerentiating SC and SD we find that
∂SC
∂λ
=
3 (2δ + 1) δ
(8λδ − δ + 3λ)2
≥ 0
∂SD
∂λ
=
3
¡
2λδ + λ2 + 2δ2 + 2λ2δ
¢¡
8λδ − δ − λ+ 5λ2
¢2 > 0.
Computing the diﬀerence ∂SD∂λ −
∂SC
∂λ and noting that λ ≥ 1/2 we have
∂SD
∂λ
− ∂SC
∂λ
=
g (λ, δ)¡
8λδ − δ − λ+ 5λ2
¢2
(3λ− δ + 8λδ)2
> 0,
where
g (λ, δ) ≡ 3δ3 (2λ− 1) + 3λδ2
¡
8λ2 − 2
¢
+ 3λ2δ (22λ− 1) + 192λ3δ3(2λ− 1)
+3λ4(9 + 41δ + 110δ2) + 3λ2δ2(31 + 54δ).
iii. Since ∂bC/ ∂δ = λ(2λ− 1)/ (λ+ δ)2 > 0 and ∂bD/ ∂δ = −λ2(2λ− 1)/
¡
λ+ δ − λ2
¢2 < 0 it
follows that ∂SC/ ∂δ = ∂SC/∂bC · ∂bC/ ∂δ > 0 and ∂SD/ ∂δ = ∂SD/∂bD · ∂bD/ ∂δ < 0. Finally,
by taking limits we have
lim
δ→∞
bC = (2λ− 1)
lim
δ→∞
bD = (2λ− 1)
which implies that lim
δ→∞
SC = lim
δ→∞
SD. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 4: a. Centralization: From (28) and (29) and Lemma 1 we have that
ΠC = −
¡
AC
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
+ (1−AC)SC
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢¢
.
b. Decentralization: From (30) and (31) and Lemma 1 we have that
ΠD = −
¡
AD
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
+BDSD
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢¢
. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Substituting (3) and (4) into the definitions of ALC and CLC and making
use of Lemma A2 gives
ALC =
µ
1− 1 + 8δ (1 + δ)
(4δ + 1)2
(1− SC)
¶¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
(32)
and
CLC =
1
(1 + 4δ)2
(1− SC)
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
. (33)
Similarly, substituting (6) and (7) into the definitions of ALD and CLD and making use of Lemma
A2 we obtain
ALD = δ2
Ã
1
(λ+ δ)2
−
¡
2δ2 − λ2
¢
(λ+ δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
(1− SD)
!¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
(34)
and
CLD =
λ2
(λ+ δ)2
µ
1− δ (2λ+ 3δ)
(λ+ 2δ)2
(1− SD)
¶¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
. (35)
Subtracting (34) from (32) shows that ALC −ALD is equal to
λδ (2λ− 1)
¡
ω0 + δω1 + δ2ω2 + δ3ω3 + δ4ω4
¢ ¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
(4δ + 1)2 (3λ+ δ (8λ− 1)) (λ (5λ− 1) + δ (8λ− 1)) (λ+ δ) (λ+ 2δ)
, (36)
where ω0 ≡ λ2 (5λ− 1), ω1 ≡ λ
¡
33λ+ 100λ2 − 7
¢
, ω2 ≡ 2
¡
−9λ+ 240λ2 + 100λ3 − 5
¢
, ω3 ≡
2
¡
174λ+ 460λ2 − 43
¢
and ω4 ≡ 16 (53λ− 10). It is straightforward to verify that ωi > 0, i =
1, ..., 4, for all λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Inspection of (36) then shows that ALC − ALD = 0 if either δ = 0 or
λ = 1/2 and that ALC −ALD > 0 otherwise.
Next, subtracting (33) from (35) shows that CLD − CLC is equal to
λδ (2λ− 1)
¡
γ0 + δγ1 + δ
2
2γ + δ
3
3γ
¢ ¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
(4δ + 1)2 (λ (5λ− 1) + δ (8λ− 1)) (3λ+ δ (8λ− 1)) (λ+ δ) (λ+ 2δ)
, (37)
where γ0 ≡ λ2 (65λ− 7), γ1 ≡ λ
¡
107λ+ 280λ2 − 17
¢
, γ2 ≡ 2
¡
−5λ+ 224λ2 + 160λ3 − 3
¢
and
γ3 ≡ 4 (14λ+ 3) (8λ− 1). It is straightforward to verify that γi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, for all λ ∈
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[1/2, 1]. Inspection of (37) then shows that CLD − CLC = 0 if either δ = 0 or λ = 1/2 and that
CLD − CLC > 0 otherwise. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Using the expressions in Proposition 4 we have that ΠC −ΠD is given
by ¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
λδ (2λ− 1) f
(4δ + 1) (3λ+ δ (8λ− 1)) (λ (5λ− 1) + δ (8λ− 1)) (λ+ δ) (λ+ 2δ) , (38)
where
f ≡ 2δ3 (4λ− 1) (28λ− 17) + 2δ2 (5λ− 1)
¡
−3λ+ 16λ2 − 5
¢
+λδ
¡
−51λ+ 50λ2 + 7
¢
− λ2 (5λ− 1) .
Note that the denominator is strictly positive for all δ ∈ [0,∞) and λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Thus, ΠC − ΠD
is continuous in δ ∈ [0,∞) and λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Also, ΠC −ΠD = 0 if either δ = 0, λ = 1/2 or f = 0.
Let λ (δ) be the values of λ ∈ [1/2, 1] which solve f = 0 for δ ∈ [0,∞); λ (δ) is plotted in Figure
6. Note that limδ→∞ λ (δ) = 17/28 and that λ
¡
δ
¢
= 1, where δ ' 0.192 57 is implicitly defined by³
3δ + 32δ2 + 33δ3 − 2
´
= 0. Note also that λ (δ) is decreasing in δ ∈
£
δ,∞
¢
.
Part (i.): Diﬀerentiating (38) gives
d (ΠC −ΠD)
dλ
− 4
3
δ
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
(1 + 4δ)2
for λ = 1/2
which is negative for all δ > 0. Since (ΠC −ΠD) = 0 for λ = 1/2 this implies that ΠC − ΠD < 0
in the neighborhood of λ = 1/2.
Parts (ii.) and (iii.): Since λ (δ) is decreasing in δ it is suﬃcient to show that for λ = 1,
ΠC −ΠD < 0 if δ ∈
¡
0, δ
¢
and ΠC −ΠD > 0 if δ ∈
¡
δ,∞
¢
. To see this note that sign (ΠC −ΠD) =
signf and that for λ = 1, f = 2
¡
3δ + 32δ2 + 33δ3 − 2
¢
. It can be seen that f < 0 if δ ∈
¡
0, δ
¢
and
f > 0 if δ ∈
¡
δ,∞
¢
. ¥
11 Appendix B - Sequential Decision Making
Decision Making: In the last stage of the game Manager 2 chooses d2 to maximize his expected
utility E [(1− λ)π1 + λπ2| θ2, d1]. The optimal decision that solves this problem is given by
dS2 ≡
λ
λ+ δ
θ2 +
δ
λ+ δ
dS1 . (39)
At the previous stage Manager 1 chooses d1 to maximize his expected profits E [λπ1 + (1− λ)π2| θ1, m].
The optimal decision is given by
dS1 ≡
λ (λ+ δ)2
λ3 + 3λ2δ + δ2
θ1 + δ
λ2 + δ (1− λ)
λ3 + 3λ2δ + δ2
E [θ2 | θ1, m] . (40)
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Communication: Let μ2 (m2 | θ2) be the probability with which Manager 2 sends message m2,
let d1(m2) and d2(m2) be the decision rules that map messages into decisions and let g1 (θ2 | m2)
be the belief function which gives the probability of θ2 conditional on observing m2. We can now
state the following proposition which characterizes the finite communication equilibria when δ > 0.
PROPOSITION A1 (Communication Equilibria). If δ ∈ (0,∞), then for every positive integer N2
there exists at least one equilibrium ( μ2(·) , d1(·), d2(·), g1(·)), where
i. μ2(m2 | θ2) is uniform, supported on [a2,i−1, a2,i] if θ2 ∈ (a2,i−1, a2,i),
ii. g1(θ2 | m2) is uniform supported on [a2,i−1, a2,i] if m2 ∈ (a2,i−1, a2,i),
iii. a2,i+1 − a2,i = a2,i − a2,i−1 + 4bSa2,i for i = 1, ..., N2 − 1,
a2,−(i+1) − a2,−i = a2,−i − a2,−(i−1) + 4bSa2,−i for i = 1, ..., Nj − 1,
where bS ≡
¡
(2λ− 1) (λ+ δ)
¡
λ2 + δ
¢¢
/
¡
(λ (1− λ) + δ)
¡
λ2 + δ (1− λ)
¢¢
and
iv. dj(m) = dSj , j = 1, 2, where d
S
j is given by (39) and (40).
Moreover, all other finite equilibria have relationships between θ1 and θ2 and the managers’ choices
of d1 and d2 that are the same as those in this class for some value of N2; they are therefore
economically equivalent.
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. Details are available from the authors
upon request. ¥
PROPOSITION A2 (Eﬃciency). The limit of strategy profiles and beliefs (μ2(·) , d1(·), d2(·), g1(·))
as N2 → ∞ is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the communication game. In this equilibrium
the total expected profits E [π1 + π2] are higher than in any other equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2. Details are available from the authors
upon request. ¥
In the remaining analysis we focus on the eﬃcient equilibrium.
LEMMA A1. In the most eﬃcient equilibrium in which N2 →∞ the residual variance is given by
E
h
(θ2 − E [θ2|m2])2
i
= SSσ22,
where SS = bS/(3 + 4bS).
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1. Details are available from the authors
upon request. ¥
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PROPOSITION A4 (Organizational Performance). Under Decentralization with sequential decision
making the expected profits are given by
ΠS = −
¡
(AD +X)
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
+ (BD −X)SSσ22
¢
, (41)
where AD and BD are defined in (16) and
X ≡ δ3 (2λ− 1)2 2λ
4 + λ2 (6λ+ 1) δ + 2λ (2 + λ) δ2 + 2δ3
(λ+ 2δ)2
¡
λ3 + δ2 + 3λ2δ
¢2 .
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4. Details are available from the authors
upon request. ¥
We can now prove the following proposition.
PROPOSITION A5 (Sequential Decision Making). Suppose that σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2. Then,
i. For any λ ∈ (1/2, 1] Centralization strictly dominates Decentralization with sequential
decision making when coordination is suﬃciently important.
ii. For any δ ∈ (0,∞) Decentralization with sequential decision making strictly dominates
Centralization when the own-division bias λ > 1/2 is suﬃciently small.
Proof: i. Applying l’Hopital’s Rule to (14) and (41) and using the assumption that σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2
we obtain
lim
δ→∞
ΠC − lim
δ→∞
ΠS =
8λ (4λ− 1) (2λ− 1)2
(8λ− 1) (5λ− 1) σ
2
which is strictly positive for any λ > 1/2.
ii. Taking the derivative of (14) and (41) and using the assumption that σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2 we get
that
d (ΠS −ΠC)
dλ
=
8δ
3 (1 + 2δ) (1 + 4δ)
σ2 for λ = 1/2
which is strictly positive for all finite δ > 0. ¥
Finally, Figures 7 and 8 are drawn using Propositions 4 and A4.
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12 Appendix C - Diﬀerent Needs for Coordination
Since allowing for diﬀerences in the needs for coordination only requires adding a parameter in
the main model, we do not replicate the full analysis here. Instead we merely state the key
expressions and use them to prove Proposition A6 which summarizes the claims in the main text.
The derivation of these expressions and their interpretation are exactly as in the main model. Also,
to simplify we assume that σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2.
12.1 Centralization
The decisions are now given by
dC1 ≡
µ
1
1 + 2 (δ1 + δ2)
((1 + δ1 + δ2) E [θ1 | m] + (δ1 + δ2) E [θ2 | m])
¶
dC2 ≡
µ
1
1 + 2 (δ1 + δ2)
((δ1 + δ2) E [θ1 | m] + n (1 + δ1 + δ2) E [θ2 | m])
¶
.
The residual variance of θ1 is given by SC,1σ21 and that of θ2 is given by SC,2σ
2
2, where SC,j ≡
bC,j/ (3 + 4bC,j), j = 1, 2, and
bC,1 =
(2λ− 1)
³
δ2 + (δ1 + δ2)
2
´
δ2 + (δ1 + δ2)2 + λ (1 + 3δ1 + δ2)
bC,2 =
(2λ− 1)
³
δ1 + (δ1 + δ2)2
´
δ1 + (δ1 + δ2)2 + λ (1 + δ1 + 3δ2)
.
The expected profits are given by
ΠC = −σ2
µ
2
δ1 + δ2
1 + 2 (δ1 + δ2)
+ (S1 + S2)
1 + δ1 + δ2
1 + 2 (δ1 + δ2)
¶
. (42)
Applying l’Hopital’s Rule gives
lim
δ1→∞
ΠC = −2
5λ− 1
8λ− 1σ
2. (43)
We can also use (42) to evaluate dΠC/dλ:
dΠC
dλ
= −4
3
(δ1 + δ2)
1 + 2 (δ1 + δ2)
σ2 for λ = 1/2. (44)
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12.2 Decentralization
The decisions under Decentralization are now given by
dD1 =
λθ1
λ+ λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2
+
((1− λ) δ1 + λδ2) (λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)
(λ+ δ1 + δ2) (λ+ λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)
E [θ1 | θ2, m]
+
λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2
λ+ δ1 + δ2
E [θ2 | θ1, m]
dD2 =
λθ2
λ+ (1− λ) δ1 + λδ2
+
(1− λ) δ1 + λδ2
λ+ δ1 + δ2
E [θ1 | θ2, m]
+
((1− λ) δ1 + λδ2) (λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)
(λ+ δ1 + δ2) (λ+ (1− λ) δ1 + λδ2)
E [θ2 | θ1, m] .
The residual variance of θ1 is given by SD,1σ21 and that of θ2 is given by SD,2σ
2
2, where SD,j ≡
bC,j/ (3 + 4bC,j), j = 1, 2, and
b1 =
(2λ− 1) δ1 (λ+ λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)
(λ (1− λ) + λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2) ((1− λ) δ1 + λδ2)
b2 =
(2λ− 1) δ2 (λ+ λδ2 + (1− λ) δ1)
(λ (1− λ) + λδ2 + (1− λ) δ1) ((1− λ) δ2 + λδ1)
.
The expected profits are given by
ΠD = −E
h¡
dD1 − θ1
¢2
+
¡
dD2 − θ2
¢2
+ (δ1 + δ2)
¡
dD1 − dD2
¢2i
, (45)
where
E
h¡
dD1 − θ1
¢2i
= σ2
Ã
2
(δ2 + λδ1 − λδ2)2
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2
− (λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)
2
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2
S2
+
((1− λ) δ1 + λδ2) (λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)2 (2λ+ (1 + λ) δ1 + (2− λ) δ2)
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2 (λ+ λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)2
S1
!
E
h
(d2 − θ2)2
i
= σ2
Ã
2
(−δ1 + λδ1 − λδ2)2
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2
− ((1− λ) δ1 + λδ2)
2
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2
S1
+
((1− λ) δ1 + λδ2)2 (λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2) (2λ+ (2− λ) δ1 + (1 + λ) δ2)
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2 (λ+ (1− λ) δ1 + λδ2)2
S2
!
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E
h¡
dD1 − dD2
¢2i
= σ2
µ
2
λ2
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2
+
λ2 (2λ+ (1 + λ) δ1 + (2− λ) δ2) ((1− λ) δ1 + λδ2)
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2 (λ+ λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)2
S1
+
λ2 (2λ+ (2− λ) δ1 + (1 + λ) δ2) (λδ1 + (1− λ) δ2)
(λ+ δ1 + δ2)2 (λ+ (1− λ) δ1 + λδ2)2
S2
¶
.
Applying l’Hopital’s Rule gives
lim
δ1→∞
ΠD = −2
8λ3 − 9λ2 + 6λ− 1
5λ− 1 σ
2. (46)
We can also use (45) to evaluate dΠC/dλ for λ = 1/2:
dΠD
dλ
= −8
3
(δ1 + δ2)2
(1 + 2 (δ1 + δ2))2
σ2. (47)
We can now prove the following proposition.
PROPOSITION A6 (Diﬀerent Needs for Coordination).
i. For any λ ∈ (1/2, 1] and δj ∈ [0,∞), j = 1, 2, Centralization strictly dominates Decen-
tralization when coordination is suﬃciently important for Division k 6= j.
ii. For any δ1, δ2 ∈ (0,∞) Decentralization strictly dominates Centralization dominates
Centralization when the own-division bias λ > 1/2 is suﬃciently small.
Proof: i. Using (43) and (46) we obtain
lim
δ→∞
ΠC − lim
δ→∞
ΠS = 8λ (4λ− 1)
(2λ− 1)2
(8λ− 1) (5λ− 1)σ
2
which is strictly positive for any λ > 1/2.
ii. Using (44) and (47) we find that the diﬀerence in the derivatives at λ = 1/2 is given by
d (ΠC −ΠS)
dλ
=
4
3
(δ1 + δ2)
(1 + 2 (δ1 + δ2))2
σ2 for λ = 1/2
which is strictly positive for all finite δ1, δ2 > 0. ¥
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13 Appendix D - Diﬀerent Division Sizes
Since allowing for diﬀerent division sizes only requires adding a parameter in the main model, we
do not replicate the full analysis here. Instead we merely state the key expressions and use them
to prove Proposition A7 which summarizes the claims in the main text. The derivation of these
expressions and their interpretation are exactly as in the main model. Also, to simplify we assume
that σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2.
13.1 Centralization
Let β ≡ (1− α). Then decisions are given by
dC1 ≡
µ
1
αβ + δ
(α (β + δ) E (θ1 | m) + βδE(θ2 | m))
¶
dC2 ≡
µ
1
αβ + δ
(αδE(θ1 | m) + β (α+ δ) E (θ2 | m))
¶
.
The residual variance of θ1 is given by SC,1σ21 and that of θ2 is given by SC,2σ
2
2, where SC,j ≡
bC,j/ (3 + 4bC,j), j = 1, 2, and
bC,1 =
βδ (2λ− 1)
¡
β2 + δ
¢
αλ
¡
β2 + δ2
¢
+ β
¡
δ + β2
¢
(1− λ) δ + αβλ (2 + β) δ
bC,2 =
αδ (2λ− 1)
¡
α2 + δ
¢
α (δ + α2) (1− λ) δ + βλ
¡
α2 + δ2
¢
+ αβλ (2 + α) δ
.
The expected profits are given by
ΠC = −E
h¡
dC1 − θ1
¢2
+
¡
dC2 − θ2
¢2
+ 2δ
¡
dC1 − dC2
¢2i
,
where
E
h
(d1 − θ1)2
i
= σ2
µ
2δ2β2
(αβ + δ)2
+ α (β + δ)
αβ + (2− α) δ
(αβ + δ)2
S1 −
δ2β2
(αβ + δ)2
S2
¶
E
h
(d2 − θ2)2
i
= σ2
µ
2α2δ2
(αβ + δ)2
− α
2δ2
(αβ + δ)2
S1 + β (α+ δ)
αβ + (1 + α) δ
(αβ + δ)2
S2
¶
E
h
(d1 − d2)2
i
= σ2
µ
2α2β2
(αβ + δ)2
− α
2β2
(αβ + δ)2
(S1 + S2)
¶
.
Applying l’Hopital’s Rule we find that
lim
δ→∞
ΠC =
−2α (1− α) (8λ− 1) (5λ− 1)
(5λ− 1− α (2λ− 1)) (3λ+ (2λ− 1)α)σ
2. (48)
Also, diﬀerentiating we find that
dΠC
dλ
= −8
3
α (1− α) δ
α (1− α) + δσ
2 for λ = 1/2. (49)
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13.2 Decentralization
The decisions are now given by
dD1 =
¡
αλθ1 + δ (αλ+ β (1− λ)) E
¡
dD2 | θ1, m
¢¢
αλ (1 + δ) + βδ (1− λ)
dD2 =
¡
βλθ2 + δ (α (1− λ) + βλ) E
¡
dD1 | θ2, m
¢¢
βλ (1 + δ) + αδ (1− λ)
where β ≡ (1− α) and
E
£
dD1 | θ2, m
¤
=
(α (αδ (1− λ) + βλ (1 + δ)) E [θ1 | θ2, m] + βδ (αλ+ β (1− λ)) E [θ2 | θ1, m])¡
α2 + β2
¢
δ (1− λ) + αβλ (1 + 2δ)
E
£
dD2 | θ1, m
¤
=
(αδ (α (1− λ) + βλ) E [θ1 | θ2, m] + β (αλ (1 + δ) + βδ (1− λ)) E [θ2 | θ1m])¡
α2 + β2
¢
δ (1− λ) + αβλ (1 + 2δ)
.
The residual variance of θ1 is given by SD,1σ21 and that of θ2 is given by SD,2σ
2
2, where SD,j ≡
bD,j/ (3 + 4bC,j), j = 1, 2, and
bD,1 =
αβ (2λ− 1) (αλ (1 + δ) + β (1− λ) δ)
(α (1− λ) + βλ)
³
β2 (1− λ)2 δ + α2λ2δ + αβλ (1 + 2δ) (1− λ)
´
bD,2 =
αβ (2λ− 1) (α (1− λ) δ + βλ (1 + δ))
(β + αλ− βλ)
³
α2 (1− λ)2 δ + β2λ2δ + αβλ (2δ + 1) (1− λ)
´
The expected profits are given by
ΠD = −E
h¡
dD1 − θ1
¢2
+
¡
dD2 − θ2
¢2
+ 2δ
¡
dD1 − dD2
¢2i
,
where
E
h¡
dD1 − θ1
¢2i
=
σ2¡¡
α2 + β2
¢
(1− λ) δ + αβλ (1 + 2δ)
¢2
Ã
2δ2β2 (αλ (1 + δ) + β (1− λ) δ)2 (αλ+ β (1− λ))2
(αλ (1 + δ) + β (1− λ) δ)2
+
αδ3 (α (1− λ) + βλ) (αλ+ β (1− λ))2
¡¡
α2 + 2β2
¢
(1− λ) δ + αβλ (2 + 3δ)
¢
S1
(αλ (1 + δ) + β (1− λ) δ)2
−β2δ2 (αλ+ β (1− λ))2 S2
´
E
h¡
dD2 − θ2
¢2i
=
σ2¡¡
α2 + β2
¢
(1− λ) δ + αβλ (1 + 2δ)
¢2 ³2δ2α2 (α (1− λ) + βλ)2 − α2δ2 (α (1− λ) + βλ)2 S1
+
βδ3 (α (1− λ) + βλ)2 (αλ+ β (1− λ))
¡
δ
¡
2α2 + β2
¢
(1− λ) + αβλ (2 + 3δ)
¢
S2
(α (1− λ) δ + βλ (1 + δ))2
!
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E
h¡
dD1 − dD2
¢2i
=
σ2λ2¡¡
α2 + β2
¢
(1− λ) δ + αβλ (1 + 2δ)
¢2 ¡2α2β2
+
α3δ
¡¡
α2 + 2β2
¢
(1− λ) δ + αβλ (3δ + 2)
¢
(α (1− λ) + βλ)S1
(αλ (1 + δ) + β (1− λ) δ)2
+
β3δ (αλ (1 + δ) + βδ (1− λ))
¡
δ
¡
2α2 + β2
¢
(1− λ) + αβλ (2 + 3δ)
¢
(αλ+ β (1− λ))S2
(αλ (1 + δ) + βδ (1− λ)) (α (1− λ) δ − βλ (1 + δ))2
!
.
Applying l’Hopital’s Rule we find that
lim
δ→∞
ΠD =
−2α (1− α)
³
2α (1− α) + 2λ2 (2α− 1)2 (3λ− 7)− 26αλ (1− α) + 9λ− 1
´
³
1− 2α (1− α)− λ (2α− 1)2
´
(3λ (1− λ) + α (1− α) (6λ+ 1) (2λ− 1))
σ2. (50)
Also, diﬀerentiating we find that at λ = 1/2
dΠD
dλ
= −16
3
α (1− α) δ2 1− 2α (1− α)
(α (1− α) + δ)2
σ2. (51)
We can now prove the following proposition.
PROPOSITION A7 (Diﬀerent Division Sizes).
i. For any λ > 1/2 and α > 1/2 Centralization strictly dominates Decentralization when
coordination is suﬃciently important.
ii. For any δ ∈ (0,∞) Decentralization strictly dominates Centralization when the own-div-
ision bias λ > 1/2 and the diﬀerence in the division sizes α > 1/2 are suﬃciently small.
Proof: (i.) Using (48) and (50) gives
lim
δ→∞
ΠC − lim
δ→∞
ΠD
=
6αλ (1− α) (2α− 1)2 (2λ− 1)³
1− 2α (1− α)− λ (2α− 1)2
´
(5λ− 1− α (2λ− 1))
×
¡
α (1− α) (2λ− 1)
¡
42λ2 − 11λ+ 1
¢
+ λ (1− λ) (5λ− 1)
¢
((2λ− 1)α+ 3λ) (α (1− α) (6λ+ 1) (2λ− 1) + 3λ (1− λ))σ
2
which is strictly positive if λ > 1/2 and α > 1/2.
(ii.) Using (49) and (51) we find that the diﬀerence in the derivatives at λ = 1/2 is given by
d (ΠD −ΠC)
dλ
=
8
3
α (1− α) δα (1− α) (1 + 4δ)− δ
(α (1− α) + δ)2
σ2 for λ = 1/2
which is strictly positive if
α <
1
2
Ã
1 +
r
1
1 + 4δ
!
≡ α. ¥
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